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Abstract 
Over the past few decades the secular world has witnessed an increasing assault, 
specifically from the monotheistic religious fundamentalist community, on their beliefs 
and values.  The undeniable intolerance shown by the religious fundamentalist 
community has often translated into violent terrorist attacks against the secular world.  
The fact that religious beings can resort to such atrocious acts of violence has certainly 
baffled many onlookers.  It surely comes as no surprise that religious fundamentalism is 
generally viewed as a „hard-to-understand‟ phenomenon.  This literature review will 
describe the „hard-to-understand‟ phenomenon that is religious fundamentalism by 
employing social identity theory. 
 
The social identity of religious fundamentalists is generally derived from sacred texts and 
what they consider to be absolute truths.  These presumed absolute truths not only 
provide ample opportunity for the development of the „us‟/„them‟ duality, but also 
provide a platform for an intense intolerance of the „other‟, also referred to as the out-
group.  Of course, the „us‟/„them‟ duality can be created on many social dimensions, but 
religion has proven to bring quite an extensive, even murderous, intolerance to in- and 
out-group characterizations.  The ever increasing actions of religious fundamentalist 
groups over the past few decades have certainly illustrated this point with some 
conviction. 
 
The importance of social identity has been recognised in many major traditions of the 
social sciences, not excluding political science.  Social identity forms the basis of any 
group‟s actions or reactions.  Therefore, its significance stretches far beyond simply 
providing an identity to a social group.  Social identity also acts as a preamble to how a 
social group, in this case religious fundamentalists, chooses to deal with invidious 
comparisons.  By employing social identity in this particular way we can go beyond 
investigating how religious fundamentalists act and react to the point of understanding 
why they act and react the way they do.  In this study it was found that although a number 
of options to deal with invidious comparisons are available to social groups, only a few of 
these options are likely to be pursued by religious fundamentalists in order to remain a 
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relevant and competitive social group within the social hierarchy.  This approach will 
provide important insights into a formerly „hard-to-understand‟ phenomenon namely 
religious fundamentalism. 
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Opsomming 
Oor die laaste paar dekades het die sekulêre wêreld „n toenemende aanslag op sy 
oortuigings en waardes waargeneem, spesifiek vanaf die monoteïstiese godsdienstige 
fundamentalistiese gemeenskap.  Die onloënbare onverdraagsaamheid wat deur hierdie 
godsdienstige fundamentalistiese gemeenskap getoon word ontaard dikwels in 
geweldadige terroriste aanvalle op die sekulêre wêreld.  Die feit dat godsdienstige 
individue hulself begwewe tot sulke wreedaaardige dade van geweld het verseker baie 
toeskouers verydel.  Dis is sekerlik dan nie „n verrassing dat godsdienstige 
fundamentalisme gesien word as „n „moelik-om-te-begryp‟ fenomeen nie.  Hierdie 
literatuur oorsig sal die „moelik-om-te-begryp‟ fenomeen wat godsdienstige 
fundamentalisme is beskryf deur gebruik te maak van die sosiale identiteits teorie. 
 
Die sosiale identiteit van godsdienstige fundamentaliste spruit oor die algemeen uit 
heilige teks en absolute waarhede.  Hierdie absolute waarhede bied nie slegs ruim 
geleenthede vir die ontwikkeling van die „ons‟/„hulle‟ dualiteit nie, maar bied ook „n 
platform vir „n intense onverdraagsaamheid van die „ander‟, wat ook verwys word na as 
die buite-groep.  Natuurlik kan die „ons‟/„hulle‟ dualiteit op grond van baie ander sosiale 
dimensies ontwikkel word, maar godsdiens het telke male al gedemonstreer dat dit „n 
omvattende, selfs moordadige, onverdraagsaamheid na binne- en buite-groep 
karakterisering bring.  Die al ewige toenemende aksies van godsdienstige 
fundamentalistiese groepe oor die laaste paar dekades illustreer sekerlik hierdie punt met 
oortuiging. 
 
Die belangrikheid van sosiale identiteit word erken deur verskeie tradisies van die sosiale 
wetenskappe en politieke wetenskap word nie hier uitgesluit nie.  Sosiale identiteit vorm 
die basis van enige groep se aksies en reaksies.  Vir hierdie rede strek die 
betekenisvoheid ver verby die feit dat slegs „n identiteit aan „n sosiale groep verskaf 
word.  Sosiale identiteit tree op as „n voorrede vir die manier waarop „n sosiale groep, in 
ons geval godsdienstige fundamentaliste, verkies om onbenydenswaardige vergelykings 
te hanteer.  Deur sosiale identiteit op hierdie besondere manier aan te spreek kan ons 
verder gaan as om slegs ondersoek in te stel in hoe godsdienstige fundamentaliste optree 
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en reageer tot die punt waar ons kan verstaan hoekom hulle optree en reageer op hierdie 
spesifieke manier.  In hierdie studie is gevind dat alhoewel daar „n aantal opsies 
beskikbaar is vir sosiale groepe om onbenydenswaardige vergelykings te hanteer, is daar 
slegs „n paar van hierdie opsies wat mees waarskynlik nagestreef sal word deur 
godsdienstige fundamentaliste ten „n einde „n relevante en kompeterende sosiale groep 
binne die sosial hïerargie te wees.  Hierdie benadering sal belangrike insigte bring tot die 
voormalige „moeilik-om-te-begryp‟ fenomeen genaamd godsdienstige fundamentalisme. 
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The relations are the ways in which my mind perceives the connections 
between single entities, but what is the guarantee that this is universal and 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
MONOTHEISTIC RELIGION, INTOLERANCE AND ITS 
IMPACT ON RELIGIOUS SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 
1.1 The Unexpected Religious Revival 
For the beginning of the twentieth century influential sociologists and scholars of 
political science were generally in agreement that religion would cease to play an 
important role in our world (Bruce, 2003:2).  Sociologists such as Comte, Durkheim, 
Freud and Weber predicted the complete demise of religion.  This idea was taken to heart 
by many modern social scientists who agreed that “religion had no meaningful role in 
politics and society” (Fox & Shmuel, 2004:10).  However, at the beginning of the twenty-
first century it is evident that these very influential social scientists and those who 
followed in their footsteps were gravely mistaken.  
 
Today we are able to look back on the century that was supposed to bring about the 
demise of religion and witness a religious revival from the end of the Second World War 
(1945) onwards.  In this period of time the world was not only characterised by an 
unexpected religious revival but also by an increase in conflicts around the world.  Is this 
simply a coincidence?  Research suggests that it is not.  Studies, specifically done on civil 
wars, have found that between 1945 and 1960 half of all civil wars fought were “to some 
large degree informed by religio-ethnic identity” (Bruce, 2003:2).  In the period of 1960 
to 1990 this statistic rose to three-quarters (Bruce, 2003:2).  By the early 1980s another 
new phenomena relating to religion had also taken place.  Studies done by Weinberg and 
Eubanks found that in the early 1980s “terrorist activities shifted to a more religious 
pattern” (Fox & Shmuel, 2004:104).  These “terrorist activities” were mostly carried out 
by religious fundamentalists.  The involvement of religious groups in violent attacks 
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deliberately targeting civilians proved to be both disturbing and perplexing to many 
onlookers. 
 
The appearance of religiously motivated violent attacks against society became more 
numerous in the decades leading up to this current moment in time.  Fundamentalist 
branches of all monotheistic religions – Christian, Islam, and Judaism – have all 
participated in this phenomenon.  The bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and 
2001; the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995; a string of car bombs mainly in the Middle 
East; attacks surrounding the Gaza strip; and numerous abortion clinic bombings in the 
United States are but a few examples.   
 
As noted before, many terrorist attacks are practiced by religious fundamentalist groups 
but a list of conflicts provided by Harris (2006) suggests that religiously inspired 
conflicts are not limited to the religious fundamentalists.  In a recent study Fox (2004:70) 
concluded that “a significant percentage of all conflicts” are still religious conflicts.  
Harris (2006:26) provides the following examples of recent conflicts that were to a large 
extent religiously motivated: in Palestine (Jews vs. Muslims); in the Balkans (Orthodox 
Serbians vs. Catholic Croations, and Orthodox Serbians vs. Bosnian and Albanian 
Muslims); in Northern Ireland (Protestants vs. Catholics); in Sudan (Muslims vs. 
Christians); in Nigeria (Muslims vs. Christians); in Ethiopia and Eritrea (Muslims vs. 
Christians); and in Indonesia (Muslims vs. Timorese Christians). 
   
Given these statistics it is not surprising that there are authors who consistently argue 
that, as sociologist Juergensmeyer put it, the “belief structure of religion becomes a 
breeding ground for violence” (Palmer-Fernandez, 2004:371).  This study examines this 
statement and will illustrate that monotheistic religion provides a platform for the 
development of radical religious groups by creating a very strict „us/them‟ duality.  This 
„us/them‟ duality inspires a kind of intolerance for the „other‟ that could very easily 
motivate people to engage in violent conflict.  Thus, the main hypothesis is that 
monotheistic religion breeds intolerance of a nature that can lead to the development of 
radical religious groups – religious fundamentalist groups.  The reason for focusing on 
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monotheistic religion is because all three monotheistic religions claim to be in possession 
of the absolute and single truth.  Thus, the first objective of this thesis is to analyse the 
link between monotheistic religion and intolerance.   
 
1.2 Claims about Monotheistic Religion and Intolerance 
According to Cohn-Sherbok (1992:9) “genuine religious tolerance is achieved when 
people hold their religion as so important, so absolute that to part from it is to die, and at 
the same time realize from their absolute centre of being that another person‟s values and 
beliefs are just as important and as real.”  The question is: Does monotheistic religion 
promote such an attitude of tolerance as described by Cohn-Sherbok?  All monotheistic 
religions claim to be in possession of the absolute truth – the single truth.  Fisher 
(1999:10) argues that “intolerance and competition between the various religions… have 
historically been significant sources of conflict.”  However, McTernan (2003:20) claims 
that those who blame religion for intolerance “overstate the religious factor.”  But when 
religious social groups are analysed in context of the „us/them‟ duality a clear divide 
emerges between these religious groups and the possibility of intolerance amongst these 
groups become increasingly likely. 
 
Tétreault and Denemark (2004:273) argue that “religious social movements create 
powerful in-group solidarity and vicious out-group characterization.”  Huntington 
(1993:29) explained in his influential article „The Clash of Civilizations?‟ that when 
people “define their identities in religious terms, they are likely to see an „us‟ versus 
„them‟ relation between themselves and people of a different religion.”  In other words, 
within each monotheistic religion there is “a clear divide between those who adhere to the 
true faith” and those who do not (Bruce, 2003:79).  Bruce (2003:79) points out that 
“people may teach their children two languages but they do not teach them two 
religions.”  Therefore Harris (2006:13) is convinced that all holy texts inspired by God 
“are in perverse agreement on one point of fundamental importance: „respect‟ for other 
faiths… is not an attitude that God endorses” thus intolerance is “intrinsic to every 
creed.”  The argument is thus that to see religion as a source of intolerance is not to 
“overstate the religious factor.” 
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Religion has a definite influence on our world and the views we hold of it.  It succeeds in 
providing human beings with a very distinct frame of reference, probably more so than 
any other single belief system.  This argument will be elaborated on in the following 
section where the intratextual model will be illustrated and explained. 
 
1.3 Sacred Texts and Absolute Truths: An Intratextual Model 
In an attempt to understand fundamentalists Hood, Hill and Williamson (2005) developed 
the intratextual model.  According to Hood et al. (2005:22) this model is not concerned 
with the content of fundamentalist belief but rather with “the structure and process of 
fundamentalist thought.”  Thus, it is assumed that fundamentalists are correct when they 
argue that a sacred text guides itself, in other words, “a reader must go into the text and 
allow the text to speak for itself” (Hood et al, 2005:22).  Figure 1.1 illustrates this 
structure of fundamentalist thought and will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The Structure of Fundamentalist Thought (Hood et al. 2005:23) 
 
Sacred Text 
 
Principle of 
Intratextuality 
Absolute 
Truths 
Worldview 
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Hood et al. (2005:22) argue that the structure and process of fundamentalist thought 
“encapsulates three necessarily interrelated phenomena.”  First there is the principle of 
intratextuality which refers to the belief that the reader should allow the text to guide 
itself.  The two related phenomena are sacred texts and absolute truths.  According to 
Hood et al (2005:22-23) this process “involves a dialogic encounter that emerges between 
the reader and the text in which the revelation of the Divine Being becomes illuminated 
in the form of absolute truths.”  What is revealed as absolute truth “is of immediate 
necessity for maintaining the fundamentalist worldview” (Hood et al, 2005:23).  It is 
important to note here that these sacred texts are not allowed to be criticised by external 
influences as “truth is above criticism and not subject to debate” (Hood et al, 2005:24).  
These absolute truths become an objective reality to the fundamentalist.  From this point 
forward these absolute truths provide the individual with a very specific worldview.  A 
repercussion of such beliefs is that those who do not believe in the objective reality of the 
fundamentalist is considered an outsider as they do not participate in the same reality 
(Hood et al, 2005:23).  These fundamentalists develop a binary view of the world.  Due 
to the existence of a single sacred text that carries the ultimate textual authority, those 
that do not recognise this text as the single source of authority are considered a threat to 
the fundamentalist worldview and are thus treated as outsiders or as enemies.  According 
to the fundamentalist the world consists only of good and evil, members and outsiders. 
 
To explain the importance of authoritative sacred text Hood et al. (2005) use Christian 
fundamentalism as an example.  They argue: “For fundamentalists, the origin of the text 
is God, so it should be expected to speak with truth” (Hood et al, 2005:83).  According to 
Hood et al. (2005:83) “this confidence in the authoritative sacred text, held as objective 
truth, is applicable whether the text is the Bible, the Quran, the Vedas, the Torah, or any 
other sacred text.”  Of course, by taking a quick glance into fairly recent history one 
might add other texts that were considered by its followers to be an authoritative sacred 
text.  Marx‟s „Das Kapital‟ comes to mind.  In other words, authoritative sacred texts 
have not been confined to the realms of religion.  Thus, some authors are quick to argue 
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6 
 
that religion should not be singled out when discussing killing in the name of an absolute 
truth, for secular ideologies have claimed its fair share of lives for the very same reason.  
This argument will be explored in the following section. 
 
1.4 Religion vs. Secular Ideologies 
One of the main reasons that religion has been identified as a source of intolerance and 
conflict is due to its absolutist claims.  Rummel (1997:93) argues that absolutist ideology 
or religion often leads to a reasoning where the ends justifies the means, where the 
elimination of “those social groups it finds objectionable” are justified in the name of the 
ideology or in the name of a religion.  In essence, where absolutist claims exist, 
ideological or religious, the results can be atrocious.   
 
Kimball (2008:1) states: “It is somewhat trite, but nevertheless sadly true, to say that 
more wars have been waged, more people killed, and these days more evil perpetrated in 
the name of religion than by any other institutional force in human history.”  Statistics 
disagree with this statement.  According to Rummel (1997:92) “hundreds of millions of 
deaths were carried out by secular regimes.”  Communist Soviet Union, China, Khmer 
Rhouge in Cambodia, Vietnam, North Korea, Yugoslavia, and Nazi Germany are 
responsible for nearly 128 million deaths.  These countries killed in the name of a secular 
ideology.  From 1917 until 1987 the Soviet Union murdered about 61 million people of 
which 55 million were their own citizens.  Under Stalin alone 43 million perished at the 
hands of the Soviet regime.  Communist China under Mao Tse-tung murdered 35 million 
people (Rummel, 1997:91).  Although the named examples were responsible for the 
largest number of deaths, they are but a few examples of regimes that murdered their 
citizens for the sake of a secular absolutist ideology.  No war fought in the name of 
religion has claimed nearly as many lives. 
 
There are, however, a host of authors such as Harris, Dawkins and Hitchens who still 
argue that religion is the greatest source of intolerance and conflict in our modern world.  
Harris (2007:80) argues that “religion raises the stakes of human conflict much higher 
than tribalism, racism, or politics ever can, as it is the only form of in-group/out-group 
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thinking that casts the differences between people in terms of eternal rewards.”  Dawkins 
(2006:324) argues that religious absolutism “constitutes a major reason for suggesting 
that religion can be a force for evil in the world.”  While Hitchens (2007:36) is of opinion 
that religion “has been an enormous multiplier of tribal suspicion and hatred.”   
 
Hedges (2006:205) argues that “the worst suffering in human history has been carried out 
by those who preach grand, utopian visions, those who seek to implant by force their 
narrow, particular version of goodness.”  According to Hedges (2006:205) “this is true 
for all doctrines of personal salvation, from Christianity to ethnic nationalism to 
communism to fascism.”  Figure 1.2 illustrates that both secular ideologies and religion 
have its fundamentalists and its non-fundamentalists – those individuals who are fixed on 
sacred texts and absolute truths and those who are moderate in their approach and accept 
the existence of multiple truths.  A further distinction is made between violent and non-
violent fundamentalists – those who take up arms in the name of religion or ideology and 
those that choose to withdraw. 
 
 NON-FUNDAMENTALIST FUNDAMENTALIST 
 
SECULAR 
IDEOLOGY 
 
Western European Democracies 
 
Marxism, Fascism, etc. 
 
RELIGION 
 
Religious Moderates (Christian, 
Muslim, or Jew) 
VIOLENT NON-
VIOLENT 
Hezbollah, 
Al Qaida, 
Christian 
Militia 
 
The Amish 
 
Figure 1.2: Fundamentalism: Secular Ideology and Religion 
 
Religion, Intolerance, and Social Identity 
8 
 
The reason for focusing on religious absolutist claims is due to the fact that since the very 
late twentieth century and the early twenty-first century religion and religious absolutist 
claims have had a more prominent and visibly violent influence on this world than 
secular ideology.  In many instances it is found that religious fundamentalist groups are 
responsible for religiously motivated violent acts.  It should however be stated that not all 
religious fundamentalist groups are violent.  For instance, the Amish simply segregated 
from the secular world and do not commit violent acts against the secular world.  But 
although not all religious fundamentalist groups are violent, religiously motivated attacks 
are often carried out by a religious fundamentalist group.  
 
Another reason for choosing to focus on religious absolutist claims instead of secular 
absolutist claims is the fact that an ideology can be proven wrong, an ideology can fail 
and the followers of such an ideology can admit to this fact without committing a mortal 
sin.  Religion is different.  Its beliefs are constant and, in the fundamentalist case, non-
evolutionary.  An admittance to a failure of their doctrine, or an admittance to it being 
wrong is a sin very few adherers will make themselves guilty of.  By admitting to the 
falsity of one‟s religion is to betray God and your fellow adherents and it will certainly 
result in eternal condemnation.  Therefore, arguments have failed to discredit religious 
beliefs in the eyes of the believer. 
 
It is clear that religion has its critics and this thesis will attempt to illustrate why these 
critics have a valid point by discussing religion within the framework of social identity 
theory.   
 
1.5 Research Question and Research Aims 
This study will attempt to address the question asked by Palmer-Fernandez (2004:371) 
namely, is religion a “breeding ground for violence?”  In other words, does monotheistic 
religion provide a platform for the development of radical religious groups through the 
creation of a very strict us/them duality? 
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The aim of this study is firstly to analyse the link between monotheistic religion and 
intolerance by making use of social identity theory.  The second aim of this study is to 
provide appropriate illustrative examples for the options provided to deal with invidious 
comparisons as outlined by Tajfel and Turner (1979).  By answering the research 
question and achieving the research aims, it is possible to explain the hard-to-understand 
phenomenon that is religious fundamentalism. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
Jenkins (1996:7) is of opinion that “identity has become one of the unifying frameworks 
of intellectual debate.”  The role of identity has been addressed by many traditions of the 
social sciences.  Sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, historians, philosophers and 
political scientists have admitted to the importance of identity within their separate fields 
of study.  According to Jenkins (1996:9) our concern about identity is “a relation of 
uncertainty produced by rapid change and cultural contact… we encounter others whose 
identity and nature are not clear to us.”  One specific social group that has certainly 
baffled the world at times is religious fundamentalists.  Whenever it is revealed that a 
violent attack on society was masterminded by followers of a seemingly peace-loving 
religion, one that promulgates love for thy neighbour, the world seems to be puzzled.  It 
comes as no surprise then that religious fundamentalism is considered “a strange, hard-to-
understand phenomena” (Berger, 1999:2).  But a closer look reveals that the world 
simply lacks knowledge of this phenomenon.  Religious fundamentalism can be 
adequately explained and understood by approaching it within the context of social 
identity.  
 
Social identity theory, as created by Tajfel and Turner (1979), will be used to explain 
how religion creates the „us/them‟ duality – this implies the creation of in- and out-
groups.  Within the context of religion writers often refer to in-group favouratism and 
out-group discrimination.  Dawkins (2006:297) is of opinion that “[religion‟s] wanton 
and carefully nurtured divisiveness – its deliberate and cultivated pandering to 
humanity‟s natural tendency to favour in-groups and shun out-groups – [is] enough to 
make it a significant force for evil in the world.”  Thus, social identity theory will firstly 
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be used to analyse the link between monotheistic religion and intolerance. This thesis 
relies solely on the use of secondary data to compile a selective literature review 
concerning the area of religion and intolerance.  The focus will fall on monotheistic 
religion, more specifically Christianity and Christian fundamentalism. 
 
Apart from social identity theory Tajfel and Turner (1979) also provide “options for 
dealing with invidious comparisons.”  The authors provide three different options for 
dealing with invidious comparisons.  These options include individual mobility, social 
creativity and social competition.  A fourth option, namely violence, was later added by 
Horowitz (2000) and this option will be added to the framework provided by Tajfel and 
Turner.  The main framework of this literature review will be formed by the options for 
dealing with invidious comparisons as provided by Tajfel and Turner (1979) plus the 
extra option as provided by Horowitz (2000).  In such a religiously inspired world it is 
important to know what options social groups are presented with to deal with invidious 
comparisons and which options religious social groups are most likely to make use of in 
order to ensure a position of high status on the social hierarchy. 
 
Social identity theory, as created by Tajfel and Turner (1979), will be used to illustrate 
the link between monotheistic religion and intolerance.  It is important to note that 
throughout this thesis a distinction will be made between non-fundamentalist religious 
groups and religious fundamentalist groups with a specific focus on Christianity.  
Christianity is still the largest religion in the world with roughly 1.8 billion followers 
worldwide (Kimball, 2008:6).  It should also be noted that historically “Christianity 
contains considerably more violence and destruction than that of most other world 
religions” (Kimball, 2008:168). 
 
1.6.1 Delimitations of Study 
This is not an explanatory study, but a selective, illustrative descriptive overview.  The 
literature used for this particular study is not exclusive, nor exhaustive.  Due to the 
vastness of literature that deals with the concept of religion and the amount of authors 
dedicated to explore this concept the writer had to be very selective in the choice of 
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literature used.  The literature was chosen according to its relevance relative to the 
subject matter and the arguments made as well as the prominence of the authors within 
this field of study.   
 
The specific authors that have been chosen to describe and illustrate the options for 
dealing with invidious comparisons as presented by Tajfel and Turner are Sam Harris, 
Jared Diamond, Karen Armstrong, Charles Kimball, and Donald Horowitz.  Harris has 
received high praise for his work on religion and intolerance.  Diamond is a prize-
winning author of influential books of history and non-fiction.  Armstrong is a highly 
acclaimed and award-winning author in the field of religion.  Kimball, having been 
involved in negotiations and meetings with religious leaders in the Middle East, brings 
practical experience to his arguments.  Horowitz is a highly acclaimed writer in the field 
of conflict – especially ethnic conflict.  All of these mentioned authors are highly 
regarded in their specific fields of study and will provide valuable inputs to the 
framework presented by Tajfel and Turner. 
 
It is important to note that although specific authors have been chosen to form the main 
framework for each option for dealing with invidious comparisons they will not be the 
only sources that will be relied upon.  Supplementary literature will also be used in the 
discussion and evaluation of these options. 
 
Social identity theory has been used by other prominent authors to explain the 
phenomenon of religious fundamentalism.  Herriot (2007:25) states: “There appears to be 
no other theoretical perspective which offers as inclusive and powerful an explanation for 
the whole range of fundamentalist phenomena as does social identity theory.”  This is 
because social identity theory specifically focuses on „us‟ and „them‟ dynamics while 
religion has been responsible for the vicious creation of in- and out-groups, for visions of 
„us‟ and „them‟.  Thus, social identity theory was specifically chosen due to its ability to 
explain the creation of in- and out-groups based on religion. 
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1.6.2 Limitations of Study 
Not all of the literature used revolves around the main concepts, namely religion and 
intolerance, although all of the literature carries relevance in the main argument or is 
relevant within the theoretical framework. 
 
No comprehensive literature study has been done on the options for dealing with 
invidious comparisons as proposed by Tajfel and Turner.  The authors used within this 
theoretical framework also did not identify themselves specifically within this framework 
and therefore it was up to the writer to use personal discretion in dividing the literature 
used into the appropriate category.  
 
This study contributes to the theoretical framework regarding options for dealing with 
invidious comparisons as provided by Tajfel and Turner by finding appropriate 
illustrations to further describe the framework. 
 
1.7 Chapter Outline 
The outline of this study is based on social identity theory, specifically how it relates to 
monotheistic religion and intolerance, and the options for dealing with invidious 
comparisons – specifically relating to the historical experiences of the Christian faith. 
 
Chapter Two will provide an outline of social identity theory.  This chapter will 
specifically focus on the „in-group/out-group thinking‟ that has been referred to.  
Drawing mainly from the works of Tajfel and Turner (1979), but also from other 
influential academics in this field such as Allport (1954), and Hogg and Abrams (1988 & 
2001), this chapter will describe social identity theory, how it relates to group formation 
and the identification of an out-group, and how in-group favouritism and out-group 
discrimination come into play.  A relevant example will be used to illustrate social 
identity theory in practice. 
 
The second part of Chapter Two will relate religion and intolerance to social identity 
theory.  Here attention will be given to exactly how religion succeeds in creating in- and 
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out-groups and how monotheistic religions create incompatible worldviews which leads 
to competition and possibly conflict.  An important distinction will be made between 
religious fundamentalist groups and non-fundamentalist religious groups.  Here it will be 
argued that although fundamentalist groups are so intolerant of the „other‟ that they 
sometimes employ violent means to achieve their ends it does not mean that non-
fundamentalist groups are not intolerant of the „other‟ just because they do not make use 
of violent tactics.  The gradations of intolerance as provided by Allport (1954) will prove 
valuable in making a distinction between these two groups.  This distinction will be 
important in the overall argument and should be kept in mind when the options for 
dealing with invidious comparisons are discussed. 
 
A further analysis of options for dealing with invidious comparisons, as provided by 
Tajfel and Turner (1979), and the possibility of establishing peaceful ends in a world 
where religious fundamentalist groups are not uncommon will be provided in Chapter 
Three.  Violence as an option, as later added by Horowitz (2000), will be discussed as 
well.  These four sections will be the main focus of Chapter Three. 
 
The first section of this chapter will deal with individual mobility.  This refers to the fact 
that individuals can move from one group to another when they feel that such a move is 
the appropriate thing to do.  This option will be discussed mainly using the works of Sam 
Harris (2006 & 2007) and Richard Dawkins (2006) who promote the option of leaving 
one group for another, more specifically, to leave religious affiliations behind and 
become a non-believer or an atheist so to speak.  Their views will be discussed around a 
study completed by the PEW Forum in April 2009 which tracked the changes in religious 
affiliations in the United States. 
 
The second section of Chapter Three will deal with social creativity.  This option is 
further divided into three sub-parts namely (a) Comparing the in-group to the out-group 
on some new dimension; (b) Changing the values assigned to the attributes of the group, 
so comparisons which were previously negative are now positive; and (c) Changing the 
out-group.  Under option (a) which deals with a new dimension of comparison the writer 
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will mainly rely on „Collapse: How societies choose to fail or survive‟ (2005) by Jared 
Diamond to provide a framework for the discussion of this option.  In his book Diamond 
illustrates how some societies were able to completely change the main dimension of 
comparison as a survival strategy.  The Thirty Years‟ War and the Peace of Westphalia 
will be used to illustrate how the salient dimension of comparison was changed between 
Protestants and Catholics after a peace agreement was reached.  Under option (b) which 
deals with the changing of the rankings the writer will mainly draw on the works of 
Karen Armstrong (2006) and Charles Kimball (2008).  Both these authors promote 
religious modernisation as a strategy to overcome intolerance and exclusivist behaviour 
within the religious paradigm.  To illustrate how a social group can turn a negative aspect 
into a positive aspect the work of Virgil Elizondo (1983) will be relied upon.  Under 
option (c) which deals with changing the out-group the writer will again draw on the 
work of Armstong (2006).  Here Armstrong argues that in order to overcome intolerance 
we need to create a global collective consciousness where we create an in-group that 
includes all human beings.  The viability and the practical reality of this idea will be 
explored in Chapter Three. 
 
The third section of Chapter Three will focus on social competition.  Here it is argued 
that in-groups and out-groups compete for scarce resources, in this case status and power 
within the religious paradigm.  In this section the writer will draw on the work of Pyle 
and Davidson (2003) to illustrate the role of religious competition in colonial America.  
The examples of Congregationalists vs. Anglicans for the establishment of a bishop in 
America and competition between Anglicans, Presbyterians and Baptists for political 
power in Virginia will be used.   
 
The fourth section of Chapter Three will discuss violence as a reaction.  Here, again, the 
writer will rely on the work of Karen Armstrong (2006).  Armstrong argues that we might 
not have a choice but accept to violence as an undeniable fact of life.  The fact that each 
monotheistic religious group has incompatible views of the world we live in, will inspire 
many to use violent means in order to establish their worldview as the only accepted 
worldview, or at least as the most prominent worldview.  The views of Donald Horowitz 
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(2000) on „backward‟ and „advanced‟ groups will prove to be a valuable component of 
the argument revolving around social competition.  Here the role of religious 
fundamentalist groups will be the main focus point.   
 
The fourth and concluding chapter will provide an evaluation of the options for dealing 
with invidious comparisons.  These options will be evaluated according to their viability 
specifically for religious fundamentalists.  This will be done in an attempt to explain the 
“hard-to-understand” phenomena that is religious fundamentalism.  Based on the options 
for dealing with invidious comparisons the prospects for establishing peaceful ends will 
also be discussed.  Finally, possible areas for future research will be highlighted.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Social Identity Theory: 
Religion and the Creation of Out-Groups 
 
 
The group spirit, involving knowledge of the group as such, some idea of the group, and 
some sentiment of devotion or attachment to the group, is then the essential condition of 
all collective life, and all collective action – McDougall, 1921 (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:6). 
 
2.1 Social Identity Theory 
Traditionally social psychology mainly focused on “the role of the individual in the 
group” (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:3).  It was found that this approach had its limitations as 
it could not provide the science with a framework for dealing with “large scale group 
phenomena [and] the societal construction of self” (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:3).  Primarily 
during the 1970s a new approach began to take form, an approach that turned “the 
traditional perspective on its head” by focusing on the group in the individual.  This was 
to be called the social identity approach (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:3). The central belief of 
this approach is that belonging to a group involves a psychological state which differs 
from that of being a separate individual, and that it bestows social identity, or “a shared 
representation of who one is and how one should behave” (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:3).  
Social identity differs from personal identities.  The former “are derived from group 
membership, and regular group behaviour” while the latter refers to “the individual‟s 
unique blend of experiences and characteristics, and direct individual and personal 
behaviour” (Herriot, 2007:26).   
 
According to Austin and Worchel (1979:9) intergroup relations “refer to relations 
between two or more groups and their respective members.”  Social identity theory 
makes certain assumptions concerning society and intergroup relations.  The first 
assumption is that society consists of social categories that stand in status and power 
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relations to one another.  The social categories are based on characteristics such as 
religion, class, race, nationality, gender, and so forth.  Some of these categories enjoy 
more power and status than others.  It is also important to note that none of these 
categories can stand in isolation.  These categories can only be formed in contrast to other 
categories.  Allport (1954:41) argues: “Every line, fence or boundary marks off an inside 
from an outside [and] therefore, in strict logic, an in-group always implies the existence 
of some corresponding out-group.”  For instance, a social category formed on the basis of 
Christianity is quite meaningless if it does not distinguish between those who are 
Christians and those who are Muslims or Jews.  In order for any category to have 
meaning or relevance it is thus of great importance that a contrasting category exists 
(Hogg & Abrams, 1988:14). 
 
Social categories inspire group formation.  Tajfel and Turner (1979:38) define the group 
as “a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social 
category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, 
and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and of 
their membership of it.”  A group or social category provides the group member with a 
structure of self-reference and thus an identity.  Seul (1999:556) defines group identity as 
“members‟ shared conception of its enduring characteristics and basic values, its 
strengths and weaknesses, its hopes and fears, its reputation and conditions of existence, 
its institutions and traditions, its past history, current purposes, and future prospects.”   
 
Kelman, as cited in Seul (1999), identifies three processes of social influence in identity 
construction through interaction with group members.  These are compliance, 
identification, and internalisation.  Compliance involves conformity to a group‟s 
expectations in order to gain approval and to secure favourable treatment.  To a certain 
extent it also involves obedience to authority figures.  A slightly more advanced process 
of social influence involves identification.  Identification refers to the process where an 
individual adopts the behaviour of the group in order to be successfully associated with 
the group and establish a self-concept related to the group.  This mainly involves 
adopting “pre-established identities” and gaining status as an individual by belonging to 
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the specific group.  Internalisation is the most advanced process of social influence.  This 
occurs when the individual adopts characteristics of the group‟s behaviour because they 
find that the group values are consistent with their own values (Seul, 1999:555).   
 
Tajfel and Turner (1979:40) argue that social identity consists “of those aspects of an 
individual‟s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives 
himself as belonging.”  Belonging to a group will inspire certain “groupy” behaviours 
such as “conformity to in-group norms and discrimination against the out-group” so that 
once an individual belongs to a group they will act accordingly (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988:3; Herriot, 2007:30).   
 
Social identity theory emphasizes the importance of being a member of, or belonging to, 
a group and the effects this membership will have on the individual and influence the 
individual‟s behaviour.  Belonging to a group will most likely inspire feelings of 
attraction toward other members of the in-group.  It can also lead to the stereotyping of 
the out-group and the creation of negative bias toward out-group members and a 
favourable bias toward the in-group (Hogg & Abrams, 2001:254).  According to Tajfel 
and Turner (1979:38) in-group bias refers to “the tendency to favor the in-group over the 
out-group in evaluation and behaviour.”  This type of biased behaviour is motivated by 
the need to enhance self-esteem (Herriot, 2007:28).  Evidence has shown that this is an 
“omnipresent feature of intergroup relations” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:38).  The minimal 
group paradigm, a model created based on an experiment performed by Tajfel and 
Turner, proves the mere fact of belonging to a group is a sufficient condition for creating 
in-group bias (Hogg & Abrams, 2001:175).  This paradigm has consistently shown that 
group members always try to maximize the in-group‟s gains and the out-group‟s losses.  
In cases it has shown that in-group members will settle to gain less for their own group as 
long as the out-group loses more (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:49).  The conclusions that have 
been drawn from this paradigm is first, that a high level of out-group discrimination can 
be expected and second, the mere fact of belonging to a group is a sufficient condition for 
the existence of intergroup competition and discrimination (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:51).  
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There are two ways by which an individual can attain group membership.  Allport 
(1954:33) explains that sometimes an individual needs to fight to attain in-group 
membership.  This is referred to as attained status.  However, memberships are 
predominantly “conferred automatically by birth and family tradition” (Allport, 1954:33).  
This is referred to as ascribed status.  In the case of ascribed status the individual is born 
into an existing structure where categories are formed on the basis of a number of factors 
such as place of birth, race, parentage, religion, and so forth.  Individuals will become 
part of some groups but not of others as determined by these factors.  The individual will 
then “internalize the dominant ideology” of their group and in the process acquire a 
particular social identity which could either be positive or negative depending on the 
collective group‟s status (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:27).  The reason why individuals are 
fond of identifying with a group or belonging to a group is because this identification is 
such an essential facet of self-definition (Hogg & Abrams, 2001:254).  Self-esteem can 
be increased by the mere fact of belonging to a group because “it requires a degree of 
acceptance by one‟s fellow adherents” (Herriot, 2007:100).  Also, by comparing your 
own group to the out-group the individual is able to enhance self-esteem (Herriot, 
2007:100).   
 
Once group identity, and thus the identity of its members, has been established the in-
group will identify certain out-groups.  The concepts of in-group and out-group are 
widely used within social identity theory.  To conceptualise in-group it is best to use the 
definition provided by Allport (1954).  Although he admits to the fact that defining an in-
group precisely is difficult he states that “members of an in-group all use the term we 
with the same essential significance” (Allport, 1954:31).  In contrast, the out-group is all 
of those who are not classified as being part of the in-group.   
 
In order to differentiate the in-group from the out-group three variables should come into 
play.  First, the internalisation of the individual into the group should have occurred - 
meaning the individual‟s concept of self must be linked with the group‟s status.  Second, 
the dimension of comparison between the in-group and out-group must be relevant.  
Tajfel and Turner (1979:41) argue that “not all between-group differences have 
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evaluative significance.”  Comparisons that are made and the evaluations derived from 
them should be significant on some level.  Third, in-groups do not compare themselves 
with any or all available out-groups.  The group of comparison should be relevant to the 
in-group.  Factors such as “similarity, proximity and situational salience” determine 
comparability (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:41).  The overall aim of comparison and 
differentiation is to achieve a position of superiority over the group(s) of comparison 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979:41).  Hogg and Abrams (1988:23) are of opinion that “it is 
important to accentuate intergroup differences especially on those dimensions which 
reflect favorably upon the in-group.”  Should the in-group make a comparison on a 
dimension where they “fall at the evaluatively positive pole, the in-group acquires a 
positive distinctiveness, and thus a relatively positive identity in comparison to the out-
group.” 
 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that certain assumptions can be made about individuals 
and their group membership.  First, individuals strive to attain a positive sense of self, an 
enhanced self-esteem.  Second, since the individual is an integrated part of a group the 
group membership will determine whether the individual‟s self-concept will be positive 
or negative based on the evaluation of the group as a whole.  Third, the evaluation of the 
group is determined through comparisons with other groups “in terms of value-laden 
attributes and characteristics” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:40).  A positive outcome of these 
comparisons will result in high prestige while a negative outcome will result in low 
prestige.  Another assumption that can be made based on the previous assumptions is that 
a positive social identity is to a large extent based on favourable comparisons made 
between the in-group and the out-group.  When the individual is not satisfied with the 
status of the group, and thus their social identity, they can leave the group and join a 
group of higher status or they can try to find a way to make their existing group‟s identity 
“more positively distinct” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:40).  The perception that individuals 
hold of the group that they belong to has a profound effect on their social identity.  Those 
who consider their group to have high status identify more strongly with it.  Stronger 
identification leads to a greater commitment to the group and its objectives (Herriot, 
2007: 36). 
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From the outline provided it is evident that there are certain consequences which present 
themselves as a result of in-group formation.  When the in-group is formed it is formed 
relative to another group or in opposition to another group.  It follows then that members 
of the in-group are likely to show discriminatory behaviour towards members of the out-
group while favouring the in-group.  Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that if it is true that 
this “generic norm of behaviour” exists toward the out-group it implies that there are 
some consequences which should follow.  The first is that discriminatory behaviour 
towards the out-group may be present even if it is not in the in-group‟s interest to show 
such behaviour – meaning if the in-group will not gain anything as a result of this 
discriminatory behaviour.  The second consequence is that discriminatory behaviour may 
manifest itself even if attitudes of hostility toward the out-group were previously absent.  
A point that follows from this is the fact that discriminatory behaviour may be present 
before feelings of hostility or attitudes of prejudice have been formed.  If these 
consequences are accurate we can expect discriminatory intergroup behaviour even when 
there is no conflict of interest involved or where there is no history of intergroup hostility 
(Hogg & Abrams, 2001:181-182).  
 
2.1.1 Intergroup Competition 
Social identity theory of Tajfel and Turner (1979) mainly deals with intergroup conflict.  
They are mostly concerned with intergroup competition over scarce resources and the 
consequences of such competition.  They also refer to the fact that “superordinate goals” 
make cooperation possible while a conflict of interest between two groups “develop[s] 
through competition into overt social conflict” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:33). 
 
Intergroup relations are characterised by intergroup competition.  Hogg and Abrams 
(2001:175) describe intergroup relations as being “at best competitive and at worst 
outright hostile and discriminatory.”  Groups will compete over scarce resources which 
can either be material - where it involves land, water, money, and so forth - or 
psychological where it mainly involves issues of status and/or power.  Tajfel and Turner 
(1979:36) assert that “whenever social stratification is based upon unequal division of 
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scarce resources – such as power, prestige, or wealth – between social groups” the 
relationship will be characterised by out-group antagonism between “over- and 
underprivileged groups.”  In the act of competing these groups also strive to “promote 
and protect their positive distinctiveness from one another and secure a relatively 
favourable social identity” (Hogg & Abrams, 2001:9).  Group members are usually 
motivated at individual level to compete with members of the out-group due to the fact 
that “group membership mediates self-evaluation via social identity” (Hogg & Abrams, 
2001:9).   In essence this means that being part of a „winning‟ team or a superior group 
makes individuals feel good about themselves – it inspires “a positive sense of self-
esteem” (Hogg & Abrams, 2001:9). 
 
While intergroup competition can lead to higher group status, increased prestige, and as a 
result positive self-identification for individual members, it also leads to greater 
intragroup cohesiveness (Austin & Worchel, 1979:216).  It has also been found that the 
more a group succeeds when engaged in intergroup competition the more favourable their 
attitudes become toward the in-group while out-group discrimination increases (Austin & 
Worchel, 1979:217).  Intergroup competition “enhances intragroup morale, cohesiveness 
and cooperation” while conflict “heighten[s] identification with, and positive attachment 
to, the in-group” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:33). 
 
The status relations between the dominant and subordinate group will determine the 
subordinate group‟s identity problems.  The subordinate group will frequently see 
themselves as inferior and an antagonistic feeling arises towards the dominant group.  In 
such a case the subordinate group may reject their negative in-group evaluation and in 
return create a positive group identity which is often accompanied by a revived 
aggression to achieve their objectives.  However, there are exceptions to this rule.  It has 
been found that “where social structural differences in the distribution of resources have 
been institutionalized, legitimized, and justified through a consensually accepted status 
systems” feelings of antagonism towards the dominant group were reduced (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979:37).  Thus, an unequal distribution of resources will lead to feelings of 
antagonism toward the dominant group only if the subordinate group reject their identity 
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based on inferiority and instead create a positive group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979:38). 
 
2.1.2 The Sherif Experiment at Robbers Cave (1954) 
To illustrate social identity theory in practice it is appropriate to provide the reader with 
an outline of an experiment performed by Sherif.  In a series of experiments ranging from 
1949 to 1954 Sherif attempted to explore the issue of intergroup relations.  This section 
will exclusively focus on the 1954 experiment which was conducted at a summer camp at 
Robbers Cave for boys between the ages of eleven and twelve years.  These boys had 
never had any contact with each other prior to their arrival at the summer camp.  All of 
them had more or less the same background – coming from white, Protestant, middle-
income backgrounds.  In terms of their physical and intellectual characteristics they were 
all considered to be „normal‟.  It is also important to note that the camp organisers were 
researchers and the boys were unaware of the fact that an experiment was being 
conducted, much less so that they were the central focus of this experiment (Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988:43).  
 
At arrival the boys were simply divided into two groups who would be living in separate 
cabins and would independently engage in activities such as cooking, camping out, and 
so forth. During this period “the groups developed their own codes, nicknames and 
jargon, and defined their territory by naming various landmarks” (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988:44).  They developed group norms and rules and ridiculed those members that did 
not abide by these norms and rules in an effort to keep the members in line.  They also 
named their groups, in this specific case „The Rattlers‟ and „The Eagles‟.  This completed 
the group formation stage as the groups had created a clear set of internal norms and 
values which members were expected to adhere to (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:44). 
 
After the group formation stage was successfully completed the researchers moved on to 
the second stage which involved the two groups, who previously operated independent of 
each other, to come into contact.  Here the two groups would compete for a prize.  Thus, 
a tournament was launched involving different games such as a treasure hunt and a 
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baseball match.  During these games “the initial spirit of goodwill disappeared” (Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988:44).  The boys began to tease and mock members of the other group and 
called them names.  By the end of the tournament the boys from the two separate groups 
refused to speak to each other and what is more, they launched secret attacks on each 
other‟s cabins.  There was also an interesting incident at the end of a game which 
required each team to collect as many scattered beans as they could within a 
predetermined time.  At the end of this game the boys were asked to gather round.  For a 
brief moment the beans that were collected by group A were displayed on the screen and 
the boys were asked to estimate the amount of beans displayed.  This was done again to 
display the amount of beans collected by group B.  In actual fact both slides showed 
thirty-five beans but each time the in-group overestimated the amount of beans on the 
screen while the out-group underestimated the very same amount (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988:44). 
 
The conclusions that were finally drawn from this specific study were as follows.  The 
first conclusion drawn was that “cultural, physical, and personality differences are not 
necessary for the emergence of intergroup conflict” (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:44-45).  The 
second conclusion was that “the existence of two groups in competition for a goal which 
only one can attain is a sufficient condition for intergroup hostility” (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988:45). 
 
This experiment was chosen as an example because of its ability to illustrate how in-
groups are formed and how this affects intergroup relations and behaviour towards the 
out-group.  It also illustrates how norms are created within the in-group and how 
membership is internalised through adherence to these norms.  Furthermore, it illustrates 
that discrimination, hostile attitudes, and biased behaviour came into play when these 
groups were competing against each other.  More conclusions that can be drawn from the 
experiment at Robbers Cave is that when groups engage in competition where gain or 
loss is measured in zero-sum terms, meaning what the one group gains the other loses, 
unfavourable stereotypes of the out-group will be formed.  These unfavourable attitudes 
will be standardised over time up to the point where “the out-group is placed at a 
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prejudicial distance even to the point that group members want nothing whatever to do 
with members of the out-group” (Austin & Worchel, 1979:10).  
 
2.2 Religion and the Creation of In- and Out-Groups 
According to Seul (1999:567) “religion remains a powerful source of individual and 
group identity [because] religion frequently serves the identity impulse more powerfully 
and comprehensively than other repositories of cultural meaning can or do.”  In terms of 
religion and identity Seul (1999:558) argues that apart from religion “no other 
repositories of cultural meaning have historically offered so much in response to the 
human need to develop a secure identity [and therefore] religion is often at the core of 
individual and group identity.” 
 
Religion is able to supply the individual with aspects that significantly contribute to their 
identity.  These include moral frameworks, institutions, traditions and so forth.  This can 
provide the individual with a sense of stability and belonging (Seul, 1999:553).  Seul 
(1999:553) is of opinion that “the peculiar ability of religion to serve the human identity 
impulse may partially explain why intergroup conflict so frequently occurs along 
religious faultlines.”   
 
It is simply not true that religious intolerance always inspires violent behaviour but 
instances can be found where religious intolerance has inspired violence.  Religion 
mostly leads to violence within a peculiar set of circumstances – usually in times when 
religion becomes “fused with violent expressions of social aspirations, personal pride, 
and movements for change” (Juergunsmeyer, 2001:10).  These circumstances can often 
be found where groups actively pursue a positive identification in the hierarchy of social 
groups. 
 
Selengut (2003:238) argues that “so long as religion is about ultimate truth and 
commitment to the sacred, to a vision of utopia described in holy scripture, men and 
women will be defenders of the faith and willing soldiers in the battles for God.”  These 
claims made by Selengut will be investigated in the following sections.   
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2.2.1 Absolute Truth Claims 
It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration 
to those that are different opinions (which might have been granted), that has produced 
all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon account of religion –
John Locke (1963:105). 
 
Hick (1985:16) is of opinion that “the importance of religious beliefs to the believer lies 
ultimately in the assumption that they are substantially true references of the nature of 
reality.”  Kimball (2008:49) agrees with this statement when he argues that in every 
religion truth claims “constitute the foundation on which the entire structure rests.”  This 
idea has already been explained through the intratextual model outlined in Chapter One.  
In believing that your religion is the only true religion it also means that you believe 
salvation is restricted to the followers of your faith and that you are thus in a position of 
unique superiority (Hick, 1985:49).  It is then possible for religious groups to construct a 
hierarchy consisting of all religious groups and rate them according to how close they are 
to the truth or how far they are from it. 
 
The holy texts of all three monotheistic religions provide their readers with a clear 
indication of the holy ones and the infidels, the ones that will gain access to heaven and 
the ones that will be condemned for all eternity.  Thus, these texts provide their readers 
with a clear indication of the in-group and the out-group (Seul, 1999:560).  The very fact 
that these texts promote an image of God saving some and punishing others contribute to 
the notion that there exist an „us‟ and „them‟, a right and wrong, and a superior and 
inferior (Ritter & O‟Neill, 1996:40). 
 
Truth claims justify attitudes of verbal rejection and discrimination and behaviours such 
as the use of physical violence towards those who do not adhere to the one true religion.  
The problem is that once an in-group and out-group are established intergroup relations 
have the tendency to become vicious and outright cruel.  It is often the case that members 
of the out-group fall outside the boundaries of the in-group‟s moral concern.  Harris 
(2006) provides a fitting, nonetheless upsetting, example.  He asks how a Nazi soldier 
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was able to return home after a day‟s work of torturing and killing Jews, adults and 
children alike, and be a loving father to his children and a loving husband to his wife.  
According to Harris (2006:176) the answer is quite simple: the Jews were not “objects of 
his moral concern” because they were members of the out-group.   
 
According to Kimball (2008:54) absolute truth claims have “potentially destructive 
consequences [as] people presume to know God, abuse sacred texts, and propogate their 
particular versions of absolute truth.”  Due to the fact that adherents to the „true‟ religion 
accept their beliefs as being the absolute truth they rarely question or criticize their own 
beliefs and, as a result, their beliefs become rigid and fixed (Kimball, 2008:54).  Rigid 
truth claims often leads to the dehumanisation of the out-group and their „false‟ beliefs.  
In times of conflict these truth claims become an even more volatile basis for demonizing 
and dehumanizing the out-group (Kimball, 2008:61). 
 
It is no far stretch to come to the conclusion that it is the narrow religious worldviews 
described in this section that inspire intolerance and ultimately conflict.  Overcoming 
these narrow religious worldviews may be the answer to overcoming religious 
intolerance but it also may just be one of the biggest challenges this world currently faces 
(Kimball, 2008:4).  The Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas wrote: “Outbursts of 
violence derive not from the breakdown of reason but from employing the wrong sort of 
reason, the sort that learns there is no place for the other” (Palmer-Fernandez, 2004:371). 
 
2.2.2 Religious Worldviews: In Pursuit of Utopia 
...people appeared who began devising ways of bringing men together… so that all might 
live in harmony. Wars were waged for the sake of this notion… ‘the wise’ strove with all 
expedition to destroy ‘the unwise’ and those who failed to grasp their idea, so they might 
not hinder its triumph – Fyodor Dostoyevsky (Gray, 2008:20). 
 
Foucault describes a worldview as “a paradigm of thinking that defines the conditions… 
of all knowledge” (Juergunsmeyer, 2001:13).  According to Jeurgunsmeyer (2001:13) “it 
also involves the notion of a nexus of socially embedded ideas about society.” 
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Every monotheistic religion provides its followers with a worldview (Seul, 1999:559).  
The reader is once again referred back to the intratextual model on page four where the 
influence of sacred texts and absolute truths on the religious individual‟s worldview is 
illustrated.  This worldview is tied to certain social expectations, rules and norms, and a 
view of what the perfect society should look like, in other words, what their utopia 
consists of.  By presenting its followers with a concrete worldview religion inspires its 
adherents to think and behave in a certain way (Fox & Shmuel, 2004:2).  Religious 
traditions provide a worldview which supplies the individual and/or the group with a 
purpose and an ultimate goal.  This worldview, inspired by sacred texts and religious 
traditions, provides “symbolic maps for the journey” (Kimball, 2008:202).  For instance, 
the Bible, ranging from Genesis to Revelations, provides the Christian community with a 
frame of reference which explains where they come from and where they are going 
(Kimball, 2008:202).  The individual will also be able to draw on this framework in terms 
of attitudes and behaviour toward the out-group.   
 
Kimball (2008:209) argues that “our ways of seeing and interpreting the world, or 
framing issues, and even of asking questions” are strongly tied to our religious 
backgrounds and traditions.  Different religions have different views of what „the good 
life‟ is that their followers should aspire to achieve by putting forward a variety of ideals.  
Should one achieve this „good life‟ it would bring ultimate happiness to the individual 
(Brümmer, 2007:185,191).  Because different religions present their followers with 
different worldviews we often find several groups striving to establish their worldview as 
the dominant worldview, and although not all of these groups use violence as a means to 
establish their worldview, tensions are sure to arise.  The fact that different worldviews 
exist, of which only one can be true when taking single truth claims into account, leads at 
best to uneasy relations between the different religious groups.  If every monotheistic 
religion promotes their worldview as the superior worldview and adherents strive to 
establish a utopian society based on these worldviews, they are bound to have some 
clashes of interest and antagonistic behaviour between these groups will be at the order of 
the day.  Gray (2003:23) argues that these clashes are “endemic in every society.”  In the 
Religion, Intolerance, and Social Identity 
29 
 
history of religion we can find many examples of communities that strived to achieve the 
ideal perfection by creating a utopia based on their religious frameworks (Gray, 2008:23).  
Gray (2003:23) provides the example of the theocratic-communist city-state set up by 
John of Leyden as such a religious utopia.  The fact that every religious community 
“outlines a path toward the desired goal” urges us to ask the question: How can each 
group function best “in a world in which most others don‟t share the same understanding” 
(Kimball, 2008:23, 100)?  Another important question that should be addressed is 
whether violent attacks can be avoided in the process?  These questions will be addressed 
in the concluding chapter. 
 
Juergunsmeyer (2001:7) admits to be puzzled by the fact that people who adhere to 
religions that are “dedicated to a moral vision of the world” are capable of committing 
such violent acts as has often been the case.  He should not be puzzled by this fact for it is 
exactly because these people are so „dedicated to a moral vision of the world‟ that they 
would go to any lengths to make their vision the dominant vision of all people.  Hitchens 
(2007:231) argues that “the ideal of a utopian state on earth, perhaps modeled on some 
heavenly ideal, is very hard to efface and has led people to commit terrible crimes in the 
name of the ideal.” 
 
2.3 Religious Fundamentalism vs. Non-Fundamentalism  
The Fundamentalist Project at the University of Chicago there are five main features that 
distinguish religious fundamentalist movements from non-fundamentalist movements.  
The first feature of fundamentalist movements is reactivity. The movements form as a 
reaction to modernism.  The second feature is dualism which means they view the world 
in binary terms, as either good or evil.  The third feature is authority.  Fundamentalists 
are willing to obey their holy text and the leaders of their movement.  The fourth feature 
is selectivity.  This refers to the fact that fundamentalists choose which parts of their holy 
book enjoy precedence over others.  The fifth feature is millennialism.  Fundamentalists 
believe in the end God will establish his kingdom on earth.  Not all fundamentalist 
movements contain all five of these features but to some extent each movement conforms 
to a number of these features.  The fundamentalist movements that exhibit most of these 
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features are found within the monotheistic framework.  The one common feature that all 
fundamentalist movements have is the fact that they were formed as a reaction to 
modernism.  Fundamentalist movements perceive modern society to be hostile to 
religion, thus, their main objective is to destroy it (Herriot, 2007:6-7).  According to 
Herriot (2007:9) it is this reactivity that “constitutes an opportunity for the „us‟ versus 
„them‟ dynamic which underpins social conflict.” 
 
Apart from the five features, another difference can be found between religious 
fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist groups.  The fundamentalist worldview is 
absolutist.  In their minds there are no doubts that they adhere to the one authentic faith 
and that their beliefs and way of living should be adopted by everyone else.  The non-
fundamentalist groups are more open to the fact that they live in a diverse society and that 
other people hold different values and beliefs, to which they are completely entitled 
(Herriot, 2007:11). 
 
According to Allport (1954:49) “people with salient attitudes toward out-groups may 
express them with all degrees of intensity.”  He identifies three gradations of intolerance.  
The first and lowest form of intolerance is verbal rejection.  This includes anything from 
jokes about out-group members to a degrading term used to refer to members of the out-
group.  Stereotypes have a significant influence here.  When verbal rejection reaches a 
high degree of intensity it can lead to the second degree of intolerance, namely 
discrimination (Allport, 1954:49-51).  The United Nations defines discrimination as the 
act of denying individuals or groups of people the “equality of treatment which they may 
wish” (Austin & Worchel, 1979:191).  According to Allport discrimination “legitimizes 
the exclusion of a whole category of individuals who find themselves marked or 
stigmatized as members of an out-group… and it functions to prove the inferiority of out-
group standards to our own” (Austin & Worchel, 1979:191).  This also includes formal 
segregation which involves complete spatial separation that “accentuates the 
disadvantage of members of an out-group” (Allport, 1954:49).  An intense degree of 
discrimination can lead to the third and highest degree of intolerance, namely physical 
attack.  In the case of physical attack the in-group has completely failed to look at 
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members of the out-group as individuals but rather sees them as completely embedded in 
the identity of the out-group – implying the firm establishment of stereotypes.  Long 
periods of verbal rejection and discrimination usually precede the use of physical 
violence (Allport, 1954:57-58). 
 
According to the Fundamentalism Project the term fundamentalism “refers to a 
discernable pattern of religious militancy by which self-style „true believers‟ attempt to 
arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and 
create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviours” (Herriot, 2007:6).  It 
should however be noted that not all religious fundamentalists show a „pattern of 
religious militancy‟ as not all religious fundamentalist movements are violent.  For 
instance, the Amish, mainly found in Pennsylvania, is a religious fundamentalist 
movement that has not committed any violent acts against the secular world.  They have 
simply removed themselves from it and now live in seclusion.  It is thus important to 
mention that the difference between religious fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist 
movements is not necessarily a difference between groups that use violence as a means to 
an end and those that do not use violence.  But it is also true that although not all 
religious fundamentalist groups engage in religious violence, violent acts committed in 
the name of religion are often committed by religious fundamentalists.  These groups 
engage in the highest degree of intolerance, namely physical attack.   
 
The aim of providing gradations of intolerance in this case is to illustrate that religious 
fundamentalists, violent or not violent, show a higher degree of intolerance towards the 
out-group than non-fundamentalist religious movements.  While non-fundamentalist 
religious movements may only verbally reject the other, religious fundamentalist 
movements show much higher degrees of intolerance.  The Amish, although non-violent, 
have separated themselves spatially from the out-group.  They have segregated by choice 
to form their own community of people who adhere to the same religion and engage in 
the same practices, thus accentuating their own superiority.  Armstrong (2004:215) calls 
this an act to “create holiness by means of segregation.”  According to the gradations of 
intolerance spatial separation can be seen as a high degree of discrimination.  Thus, the 
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Amish case illustrates that even non-violent fundamentalist groups show a higher degree 
of intolerance than non-fundamentalist religious groups.  There are, of course, a number 
of religious fundamentalist groups that commit violent acts against the out-group.  This is 
graded as the highest degree of intolerance by Allport (1954).  It has been illustrated in 
this paragraph that both non-violent religious fundamentalist groups as well as violent 
religious fundamentalist groups are more intolerant of the out-group than non-
fundamentalist religious groups, when measured against the gradations provided by 
Allport.  Thus, a further analysis of religious fundamentalism and social identity is 
required. 
 
2.3.1 Religious Fundamentalism and Social Identity 
According to Armstrong (2006) religious fundamentalism has become a force that cannot 
be ignored.  She is of opinion that it is “an essential part of the modern scene… and it is 
crucial, therefore, that we try to understand what this religiosity means… and how best 
we should deal with it” (Armstrong, 2004:x). 
 
Christianity claims to be in possession of the single and absolute religious truth.  It is also 
the largest religion with about 1.8 billion followers worldwide.  Timmerman and Segaert 
(2003:53) argue that “the deep sense of „us‟ and „them‟, the tendency to regard the other 
as alien, rather than simply different, is built into Christian consciousness from the 
earliest times.”  Kimball (2008:80) argues that truth claims can lead individuals to see 
themselves as God‟s agents and it follows from this that “people so emboldened are 
capable of violent and destructive behaviour in the name of religion.”  Although their 
ideology is based on their holy book it also includes very selective reading and 
interpretation in order to motivate action (Herriot, 2007:19). 
 
Kimball (2008:33) argues that “a substantial number of Christians” believe their religion 
is the only „true‟ or authentic religion and those who do not adhere to it are condemned in 
the eyes of God.  According to these Christians other religions are simply man-made and 
therefore flawed.  Texts that are often cited as proof of Christianity‟s superiority are John 
3:18 and John 14:6.  In John 3:18 is written: “Whoever believes in him will not be 
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condemned, but whoever does not believe in him has already been condemned, because 
he has not believed in the name of the only Son of God.”  John 14:6 reads: “I am the 
Way, the Truth, and the Life.  No one comes to the Father except through me.”  These are 
only two of the numerous examples one could find in the Bible that promote single truth 
claims (Knitter, 2002:3, 28).  These exclusivist views are “the foundation for tribalism 
that will not serve us well in the twenty-first century” (Kimball, 2008:33).  It is important 
to note that this kind of exclusivist behaviour is not limited to Christianity but can be 
found in other religious traditions as well.  For the purposes of explanation and due to its 
large following Christian fundamentalism will be used as an example throughout this 
section. 
 
Tétrault and Denemark (2004:12) describe the religious orientation of fundamentalism as 
“a reactive response to perceived or realized threats to a community defined by shared 
religious beliefs.”  Fundamentalists also “frequently incorporate utopian visions of 
communal life to guide every practice” (Tétrault & Denemark, 2004:12).  Although it is 
not only religious fundamentalists who hold a view of a utopian society it is only 
fundamentalists who actively pursue this utopia.  In actively striving to establish their 
ideal society some fundamentalists incorporate violent means to achieve their ends.  
Besides, according to the fundamentalists, their actions are executed in the name of God 
and therefore justified (Kimball, 2008:138).  In many cases, especially in religious 
fundamentalist groups, religion has been able to supply the ideology, motivation, 
organisational structure, not to mention justification for violent acts in the name of God 
(Juergunsmeyer, 2001:5). 
 
According to social identity theory there are mainly two reasons why the individual will 
join a group: “the need for self-esteem and the reduction of uncertainty” (Herriot, 
2007:37).  Because individual self-esteem is linked to group identity it means that when a 
group is victorious and gains status the group member is victorious and gains status, self-
esteem and superiority in relation to the out-group.  By belonging to a group the 
individual can also reduce uncertainty.  Due to the beliefs, values and norms the group 
provides its members with a set identity which can regulate actions.  It provides the 
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members with a frame of reference.  The case is similar for religious fundamentalists.  
The beliefs, values and norms of the group provide its members with a clear indication of 
how they should act, what attitudes to have towards certain issues, and what to believe.  It 
provides a clear worldview (Herriot, 2007:37). 
 
According to social identity theory individual members of a group will define themselves 
in terms of the group to which they belong.  In religious fundamentalist terms this 
translates to members believing that they were chosen by God to do His will here on 
earth (Herriot, 2007:26).  For fundamentalists self-esteem is enhanced through the 
knowledge that they have been specifically “chosen by God to act as His agent[s] on 
earth” and, in terms of dualistic views, that they belong to the good as opposed to the evil 
side (Herriot, 2007:50). 
 
As the individual internalises the group‟s social identity the behaviour of the individual 
will reflect this group identity.  Their behavior will be that of a group member, from that 
moment forward the individual becomes a fundamentalist Christian and will behave 
accordingly.  The group member will not be seen as an individual with a personal identity 
anymore but rather as a group member conforming to group identity (Herriot, 2007:30). 
 
A typical fundamentalist movement obliges its members to strictly conform to the 
movement‟s beliefs, values and norms.  The cohesion that results from this strict 
conformity will benefit the entire group.  Patterns of church membership in the United 
States have shown a decline in liberal „mainstream‟ churches (Herriot, 2007:47).  The 
success of fundamentalist churches may be an indication of a preference for a more strict 
religion.  Herriot (2007:47) explains that “a strict religion requires extensive socialization 
into a conformist, tightly-knit and mutually reaffirming group, which reinforces its social 
identity.”  The mere fact that fundamentalist churches have not modernised or liberalised 
has resulted in an increase in membership.  This may be due to greater self-esteem, the 
reduction of uncertainty, and a sense of greater group cohesion that these churches 
provide their members with.  It also points to the fact that churches that provide their 
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members with a strict set of values, norms and beliefs are more attractive to 
fundamentalists because it places them in clear opposition to the secular world. 
  
Group identity provides its members with a sense of self which in turns influence their 
perception of others.  For instance, if an individual is an adherent to the doctrine of 
Christianity he will define the members of the out-group in relation to his own identity.  
When dualist beliefs are taken into account members of the out-group will be defined 
either as an adherent or an infidel (Herriot, 2007:29).  The members of a fundamentalist 
group regard themselves as “uniquely blessed” and as a result considers themselves to be 
superior, and in return, treat the out-group as inferior (Herriot, 2007:27).     
 
Christian fundamentalists‟ beliefs are based on the five fundamentals as proposed in the 
early nineteenth century.  These include “the inerrancy of Scripture; the Virgin Birth of 
Christ; Christ‟s atonement for our sins on the cross; his bodily resurrection; and the 
objective reality of his miracles” (Armstrong, 2004:171).  These fundamentals were 
created as a reaction against modernity which was “destroying the foundation of 
Christian faith and identity” (Knitter, 2002:22).  When the validity or authenticity of 
these fundamentals is challenged fundamentalists perceive it as a threat to their identity 
(Herriot, 2007:54).  For Christian fundamentalists the inerrancy of the Bible is paramount 
to their belief system.  According to them God speaks directly through the Bible and thus 
every word is the literal truth (Herriot, 2007:48).  Herriot (2007:55) argues: “What cannot 
possibly be entertained is the idea that God‟s word is in any sense mistaken [because] the 
inerrancy of scripture is one of the basic and non-negotiable beliefs which are the 
foundation of fundamentalist doctrine.”  However, the secular world has constantly 
challenged the literal truth of the Bible through the use of science.  This has added to the 
growing antagonism towards the secular world.   
 
The beliefs, values and norms of religious fundamentalists are based on their holy book 
and thus very clearly defined.  This becomes a tool for distinction and a way to stereotype 
the out-group.  Those who do not adhere to the beliefs, values and norms as described by 
the only authentic holy book are regarded as godless adherents to the secular world.  
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Through this the fundamentalists “achieve maximum similarity within the group and 
maximum differentiation from the world” (Herriot, 2007:33).  This leads to a 
strengthening of the in-group‟s identity and an intensification of out-group stereotypes 
(Herriot, 2007:33).  According to Herriot (2007:33) maximum differentiation makes the 
occurrence of conflict more probable.  
 
According to Armstrong (2004:270), “in order to mobilize effectively, a group needs an 
ideology with a clearly defined enemy.” The out-group is chosen based on its relevance 
to the in-group.  The degree of security that the in-group feels in relation to the out-group 
is also an important determinant of the choice of out-group.  The out-group that is 
perceived as the biggest threat to the in-group will become the primary out-group 
(Herriot, 2007:34).  For religious fundamentalists the secular world poses the biggest 
threat to their in-group and has thus become an all-encompassing out-group. According 
to social identity theory an actual or perceived threat to the group and its members can 
inspire aggression and sometimes violent conflict.  In a society where modern values and 
science has undermined so many beliefs of the fundamentalists they must constantly feel 
threatened.  Therefore, according to the fundamentalists they are involved in conflict - 
they are struggling for survival in a secular world (Herriot, 2007:94). 
 
According to Herriot (2007:36) “group members‟ perception of their own group, their 
out-groups and the comparisons they make between them relating to status have a potent 
effect upon the strength and salience of their group social identity and hence their 
commitment to act on its behalf.”  If members perceive their group to be of higher status, 
they identify more strongly with it and this leads to greater commitment to the in-group.  
A perception of one‟s own group as a minority will evoke the same feelings.  Herriot 
(2007:36) argues that “the tendency of fundamentalists to perceive themselves a minority 
under threat of destruction by secular society is thus in reality an effective survival 
mechanism.”  In order to ensure continued survival many religious fundamentalist groups 
have taken a militant stand against the out-group(s).  
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2.3.2 Religious Fundamentalist Militancy 
According to Herriot (2007:28) people will believe that they belong to a group very 
easily and thus acquire a social identity based on the group‟s identity.  By believing to 
belong to a group and taking on the group identity as your own, the individual‟s identity 
and the group identity becomes one.  This means that should the group‟s identity be 
threatened in any way every member‟s identity will also be threatened.  In case of 
religious fundamentalists this threat is likely to come from the secular world.  A threat to 
an individual‟s identity and self-esteem may very well lead to aggression.  From here on 
conflict is a likely option for retaliation (Herriot, 2007:27). 
 
According to Armstrong (2004:178) fundamentalism “exists in a symbiotic relationship 
with an aggressive liberalism or secularism, and, under attack, invariably becomes more 
extreme, bitter, and excessive.”  Militant Christian fundamentalists hold the belief that 
being a Christian must involve more than verbal declaration of belief in the Bible 
(Knitter, 2002:22).  In other words, it must involve action as well.  Despite the fact that 
Christianity‟s central teachings revolve around love and peace the religion has had a 
violent side.  Armstrong (2004:65) argues that fundamentalism has in some 
circumstances evolved into a religion “in which the love of God is often balanced by a 
hatred of other human beings.”  In both the Old and the New Testaments of the Bible one 
can find a vivid portrayal of violent conflict.  Often it is in these portrayals that Christian 
fundamentalists find justification for their violent acts committed in the name of religion 
(Juergunsmeyer, 2001:19-20).  It is not unheard of that Christian fundamentalists justify 
their violent acts as something that God approves of.  For instance, Kerry Noble, a former 
leader of a religious fundamentalist group in the United States, called God “a man of 
war” while another activist of the same group proclaimed that the Bible is “a book of 
war, a book of hate” (Juergunsmeyer, 2001:145-146).  These types of groups believe in 
the concept of “divine warfare”, a concept that calls both for religious activism by means 
of violence as well as provide the perpetrators with a justification for their acts 
(Juergunsmeyer, 2001:146).  If militant religious fundamentalism has taught us anything 
it is that if an individual was under the impression that his/her violent acts “had been 
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sanctioned by a divine mandate” this individual is capable of doing “virtually anything” 
(Juergunsmeyer, 2001:216). 
 
For militant Christian fundamentalists “God‟s rules permit, nay require, violent assault on 
the secular world… violent fundamentalists are simply acting on the basis of their 
worldview” (Herriot, 2007:16).  By creating an enemy and fighting to establish their ideal 
society fundamentalist movements create a purpose for their lives and an “inspiring 
vision of the future” (Herriot, 2007:14).  The enemy is dehumanised by viewing 
individuals as representatives of modernism and the secular world instead of viewing 
them as innocent civilians.  Any successful attack also brings them a sense of victory and 
power and thus enhanced group identification and self-esteem (Herriot, 2007:15). 
 
Fundamentalist militancy is mainly a reaction to modernity and the infiltration of secular 
ideas into society (Appleby, 2000:87).  Castells (2004:13) is also of opinion that religious 
fundamentalists are “reactive and reactionary.”  He argues that “fundamentalists long for 
the security of traditional values and institutions rooted in God‟s eternal truth” (Castells, 
2004:24).  According to the fundamentalists the most dangerous enemies are those that 
undermine the traditional values of family which is considered as “the main source of 
social stability, Christian life, and personal fulfillment” (Castells, 2004:27).  Therefore, 
their primary targets include homosexuals, feminists, evolutionists, and those who 
consider themselves as pro-choice with regards to abortion.  Castells (2004:29) argues: 
“The American patriarchal family is indeed in crisis according to all indicators of 
divorce, separation, violence in the family, children born out of wedlock, delayed 
marriages, shrinking motherhood, single lifestyles, gay and lesbian couples, and the 
widespread rejection of patriarchal authority.”  This poses a real threat to the beliefs, 
values and norms of the fundamentalist community.  It can also be derived from this that 
pluralism and political liberalism is not something they endorse (Herriot, 2007:13). 
 
Religious fundamentalists are probably most notorious for their militancy.  However, this 
is a common mistaken stereotype for not all religious fundamentalists are militant.  There 
are other options available to these social groups to ensure their survival or deal with the 
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peculiar position they find themselves in.  Between the works of Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
and Horowitz (2000) at least four options are identified for social groups to deal with 
invidious comparisons.  These options will be the topic of the following chapter where 
each option will be outlined and illustrated through the use of relevant examples from the 
Christian faith. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Options for Dealing with Invidious Comparisons 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In-groups measure themselves in comparison to chosen out-groups.  There are mainly 
two reasons why social comparisons are so important to social groups.  First, by 
comparing themselves with an out-group the in-group is able to differentiate their own 
social identity.  A clearly defined social identity reduces uncertainty.  Secondly, the more 
distinct the in-group finds themselves to be, the greater is their self-esteem by way of 
comparison.  According to Tajfel and Turner (1979:43) status “reflects a group‟s relative 
position on some evaluative dimension.”  The lower a group‟s position is on this 
evaluative dimension, the lower its members‟ social identity will be (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979:43).  There are several ways in which groups or members of a group can address a 
low social identity.  These are referred to by Tajfel and Turner (1979) as the options for 
dealing with invidious comparisons.  This will be the main theme of this chapter where 
each of these options will be discussed in detail within the context of religious social 
groups.  Examples that will be provided for each option were found specifically within 
the Christian experiences, both past and present. 
 
The options for dealing with invidious comparisons, as provided by Tajfel and Turner 
(1979) will be discussed in sections 3.2 to 3.5.  The first option is individual mobility 
where the example of changes in religious affiliation in the United States will be 
discussed as an example.  The second option is social creativity.  This category is sub-
divided into three possible options: (a) creating a new dimension of comparison, where 
the Thirty Years‟ War and the Peace of Westphalia will be provided as an example; (b) 
changing the rankings, where two alternative possibilities of changing the rankings will 
be discussed, (i) modernise, and (ii) transforming the negative to the positive; and (c) 
changing the out-group, where (i) the example of religious fundamentalists in the United 
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States will be provided and (ii) the possibility of creating a global collective 
consciousness will be explored.  The third option for dealing with invidious comparison 
is social competition.  The examples discussed under this section will be: (i) competition 
between the Congregationalists and Anglicans for the establishment of a Bishop in 
colonial America, and (ii) competition for political power in Virginia.  The fourth option 
is reactionary violence, where the example of Christian fundamentalism in the United 
States will be provided. 
 
Before the options for dealing with invidious comparisons can be discussed, it is 
important to note that all of these options can be pursued within one of two belief 
systems: (1) social mobility, and (2) social change.  The distinction between these two 
strategies will be made in the following section. 
 
3.1.2 Social Mobility and Social Change 
A group that finds itself in a position of negative evaluation and, thus, low self-esteem for 
its members is presumed to be in an unsatisfactory position.  The group has several 
options of remedying its position vis-à-vis the out-groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988:27).  
When the individual views their social identity in a negative light they can “respond to 
the resulting psychological discomfort with one or more individual or group-level 
strategies to establish positive identity” (Seul, 1999:557).  These strategies are based on 
two belief systems: social mobility and social change. 
 
The belief system of social mobility refers to “the nature and the structure of the relations 
between social groups in society” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:35).  According to Tajfel and 
Turner (1979) those who adhere to a belief in social mobility are of the opinion that 
society is “flexible and permeable,” meaning if an individual is not satisfied with the in-
group and the norms, values, beliefs and conditions attached to membership of this group, 
it is possible for the individual to move to another group which suits them better.  Social 
mobility is a strategy for the individual to attain higher status.  It is not a group strategy 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979:35).  According to Tajfel and Turner (1979:44) low status and an 
unsatisfactory social identity will “promote the widespread adoption of individual 
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mobility strategies.”  But if the barriers to leaving one‟s group are strong, low status and 
an unsatisfactory social identity will most likely lead to the use of social change 
strategies. 
 
The belief system of social change “implies that the nature and structure of the relations 
between social groups in society is perceived as characterized by marked stratification” 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979:35).  Under this belief system it is almost impossible for the 
individual to dissociate from the current in-group.  In cases where a group follows a 
strategy to enhance group identity it will be due to the fact that leaving the group is 
difficult or impossible.  According to Tajfel and Turner (1979:35) this is often the case 
“when social identity is based to any significant extent upon persistent social 
constructions” such as race, nationality or gender.  One cannot change one‟s race, 
nationality or gender and if group membership rests on one of these important factors one 
simply cannot dissociate from the group or change groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:35).  
Religious convictions and religious affiliations often fall within this category (Seul, 
1999:557).  The belief system of social change inspires entire groups to better their status.  
The group as a whole needs to employ a strategy to move up in the status hierarchy in 
order to provide its members with a positive sense of self (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:35). 
 
The options for dealing with invidious comparisons rely on these two belief systems in 
order to achieve higher status, either as an individual (social mobility) or as a group 
(social change).  Under each discussed option the current writer will stipulate which of 
these two belief systems are promoted for the achievement of higher status.  This will be 
provided to orientate the reader to better identify from which point of view the option 
should be evaluated. 
 
3.2 Individual Mobility 
The first option for dealing with invidious comparisons is individual mobility.  According 
to Tajfel and Turner (1979:43) an individual that approaches the structure of beliefs as 
that of social mobility will be more likely to leave or dissociate himself from the in-
group.  This is usually in an attempt to achieve upward social mobility, in other words, 
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the individual joins a group with higher status which provides its members with a positive 
social identity.  A group that ranks low in the hierarchy of status often fails to provide its 
members with a positive sense of self (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:43).  Tajfel and Turner 
(1979:43) states that “the most important feature of individual mobility is that the low 
status of one‟s own group is not thereby changed: it is an individualist approach to 
achieve a personal, not a group solution.”  It requires „disidentification‟ and dissociation 
from the current in-group. 
 
Differences in theological opinion have generated much hatred and violence, not only in 
our lives, but for centuries that came before us.  This is the view of authors such as Sam 
Harris (2006 & 2007) and Richard Dawkins (2006).  These authors are convinced that a 
world without religion will be much more peaceful than a world where religion regulates 
the lives of billions.  Thus, these authors promote a strategy of individual mobility.  In the 
following section the author will rely on the works of Harris and Dawkins to explain how 
individual mobility can help to deal with invidious comparisons – especially within the 
paradigms of religion. 
 
Dawkins (2006:23-24) urges the reader to imagine, as John Lennon famously wrote, a 
world with no religion.  The people of this imagined world will not be walking around 
with memories of 9/11 or 7/7, they would not be walking around with the knowledge that 
somewhere another suicide bomber is getting ready to go to Paradise, they would carry 
no knowledge of the Crusades, witch hunts, the Israeli/Palestinian wars, or the Irish 
„Troubles‟.  According to Dawkins and Harris this world can become a reality as long as 
we are prepared to not only adopt a strategy of individual mobility, but to completely let 
go of religion, and become non-believers. 
 
In order for the individual to rid him/herself of religion, authors such as Harris and 
Dawkins do not necessarily want the individual to question their religion, as Armstrong 
(2006) promotes, in order to modernise, they rather want the individual to question the 
existence of God.  It is important to note the difference here.  Armstrong‟s (2006) 
argument is that believers should question their religion in order to modernise it, basically 
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keep up with the times, but stay a believer.  Harris and Dawkins want the individual to 
move on, rid him/herself of religion to become a non-believer.    
 
Harris provides four main reasons why the individual should become a non-believer.  The 
first reason provided by the author for the religious individual to become a non-believer, 
and not just join a different religion, is that religion in itself is the problem.  According to 
Harris (2006) religion facilitates, almost necessitates intolerance.  Harris (2006:85) states: 
“Whenever a man imagines that he need only believe the truth of a proposition, without 
evidence – that unbelievers will go to hell, that Jews drink the blood of infants – he 
becomes capable of anything.”  An individual who is truly devoted to his religion has no 
other choice than to believe it is superior to other religions as true faith inspires immense 
certainty (Harris, 2006:130).  Harris (2007:3) argues that “to be a true Christian is to 
believe that all other faiths are mistaken, and profoundly so.”  The more certain an 
individual is of religious „truth‟ the more intolerant this individual will be towards those 
that do not share his faith (Harris, 2006:86).  Harris (2006:86) provides a fitting quote 
from Will Durant which reads: “Intolerance is the natural concomitant of strong faith; 
tolerance grows only when faith loses certainty; certainty is murderous.”  Thus, Harris 
provides the ultimate reason for ridding yourself of religion.  It breeds intolerance, 
sometimes even murderous intolerance.  The worldviews provided by the religions of this 
world is in essence incompatible and therefore it is not enough to simply change your 
religion, the individual needs to become a non-believer (Harris, 2007:87). 
 
The second reason to let go of religion is because of its non-progressive nature.  
According to Harris (2006:21) the very fact that religion is in general not progressive is 
enough reason to let go of it for good.  He supports his argument by creating the 
following hypothetical situation:  
“Imagine we could revive a well-educated Christian of the fourteenth century… 
His beliefs about geography, astronomy, and medicine would embarrass even a 
child, but he would know more or less everything there is to know about God… 
Though he would be considered a fool to think that the earth is the center of the 
cosmos… his religious ideas would still be beyond reproach.” 
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Harris (2006:22) provides two explanations for the lack of progress in the area of religion 
– more specifically Christianity.  The first possible explanation is that the religion was 
perfected two thousand years ago.  Of course, Harris proves to be very skeptical of this 
point.  The second explanation, one that Harris endorses more vigorously, is that 
“religion is one area of discourse that does not permit progress” (Harris, 2006:22). 
 
The third reason to rid oneself of religion is the lack of evidence that supports religious 
belief.  Harris (2006:45) is of opinion that the time has come to admit no sufficient 
evidence exists that any holy book was authored by the creator of the universe.  It was 
written by people who considered the world to be flat.  Harris (2006:45) states: “To rely 
on such a document as the basis for our worldview is to repudiate two thousand years of 
civilizing insights that the human mind has only just begun to inscribe upon itself through 
secular politics and scientific culture.”  The many blows that science has dealt to biblical 
„truths‟ should be enough to persuade individuals to admit to the lack of evidence 
underlying their religious beliefs.  Admittance to the lack of evidence should inspire the 
abandonment of religious beliefs. 
 
The fourth and final reason to rid oneself of religion is because it is threatening to the 
continued survival of the people of this world.  Harris (2006:47) urges the religious 
individual to become a non-believer.  He is of opinion that this is a necessary step in 
order for civilisation to have any chance of survival.  In a slightly dramatic fashion Harris 
(2006:47) states: “Two-hundred years from now when we are a thriving civilization… 
something about us will have changed: it must have; otherwise, we would have killed 
ourselves ten times over before this day ever dawned.”  What Harris is referring to is the 
possibility of absolute warfare based on religious beliefs – warfare driven by the violent 
intolerance religion often inspires.  Harris (2006:225) argues: “If religious war is ever to 
become unthinkable for us… it will be a matter of our having dispensed with the dogma 
of faith.”  In other words, to avoid religious war the world needs to rid itself of religion. 
 
Although Harris (2007:81) provides a host of reasons to let go of religion he admits that 
“the prospects for eradicating religion in our time do not seem good.”  Dawkins builds on 
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this argument by providing two reasons why most people are reluctant to let go of 
religion.  The first reason is that childhood indoctrination has made religious individuals 
immune to argument.  The problem is that convincing a religious fundamentalist to let go 
of his religion is not a simple task, it may even prove to be an impossible one.  This is 
due to the fact that religion often takes a form of childhood indoctrination which allows 
the individual to build up resistance against criticism of their beliefs and therefore, as 
Dawkins (2006:28) states, “there will always be dyed-in-the-wool faith-heads [who] are 
immune to argument.”  This also partly explains why “there is no position on which 
people are so immovable as their religious beliefs” (Dawkins, 2006:60). 
 
The second reason Dawkins provide for the reluctance of the individual to let go of their 
religion is because of outright fear.  Blaise Pascal summed it up well when he said: 
“However long the odds against might be, there is an even larger asymmetry in the 
penalty for guessing wrong” (Dawkins, 2006:130).  What Pascal referred to was the fact 
that in believing in God there is nothing to lose, because if you are wrong and God does 
not exist it will not make a difference.  But should you choose not to believe in God and 
it turns out you are wrong, it results in eternal damnation.  The solution to this problem is 
simple: Believe in God.   
 
According to Harris (2006:48) “it is imperative that we begin speaking plainly about the 
absurdity of most of our religious beliefs.”  Harris, as well as Dawkins, urge the religious 
individual to allow scientific fact to persuade him/her to rid themselves of religion.  But 
Harris (2006:61) admits that “human beings are generally reluctant to change their 
minds.”  This poses a problem for the successful adoption of individual mobility 
strategies as specifically promoted by Harris and Dawkins.  Harris (2006:223) states that 
“religious faith is the one species of human ignorance that will not admit of even the 
possibility of correction.”  It is simply because, for these individuals, there is nothing to 
correct as they already know the truth.   
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3.2.1 Changes in Religious Affiliation in the United States 
In April 2009 the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life released a report entitled 
‘Faith in Flux: Changes in Religious Affiliation in the U.S.’   This document contained 
the results of a countrywide survey which aimed to determine trends of changes in 
religious affiliation.  The survey found that Americans change their religious affiliation 
often.  It was determined that close to half of all American adults have changed religious 
affiliation at least once in their lifetime (Pew Forum, 2009:1).  The survey showed that 
religious change begins early in life.  Most individuals who decide to leave their 
childhood religion do so before the age of 24.  It also showed that the large majority of 
the adult population joined their current religion before the age of 36 while very few 
changes in religious affiliation were reported for individuals above the age of 50 (Pew 
Forum, 2009:4). This can be attributed to the psychological term „sunk-cost effect‟ which 
refers to the fact that humans “feel reluctant to abandon a policy in which [they] have 
already invested heavily” (Diamond, 2005:432). 
 
With regard to the relevance of individual mobility there are a few interesting findings 
that needs to be highlighted.  First, the group that has shown the largest growth over 
recent years is the unaffiliated population.  The unaffiliated population includes atheists, 
agnostics, those who have no faith in particular, those who still feel religion is important 
but are currently unaffiliated, and the unaffiliated secularists.  While only 7 percent of the 
current unaffiliated population were raised unaffiliated this population now comprise 16 
percent of the total adult population of the U.S.  But although this group has shown the 
largest growth, it also has the lowest retention rate.  Those individuals who are 
unaffiliated are often just part of this particular population until they find a religion that 
suits their needs better (Pew Forum, 2009:8).  Reasons provided for becoming affiliated 
again are that spiritual needs were not met or the individual found a religion they liked 
more than being unaffiliated (Pew Forum, 2009:18).  
 
As has been mentioned, about 16 percent of the total adult population of the U.S. is 
currently unaffiliated.  The vast majority, about 79 percent, of this population were raised 
in a religion (Pew Forum, 2009:10).  The two main reasons provided for becoming 
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unaffiliated are not believing in God or most religious teachings anymore or not having 
found the right religion yet (Pew Forum, 2009:12).  Other relevant reasons cited for 
becoming unaffiliated is that “religious organizations focus too much on rules and not 
enough on spirituality [and] religious leaders are more concerned with money and power 
than they are with truth and spirituality” (Pew Forum, 2009:13).  About 32 percent agree 
that science proves religion to be superstition but very few cited this as the main reason 
for conversion (Pew Forum, 2009:13).  It should also be mentioned that a total of 4 
percent of the U.S. adult population who were raised unaffiliated now belong to a 
religious group (Pew Forum, 2009:17). 
  
A second interesting result is that the Catholic Church seems to have the lowest retention 
rate of all major religions.  The Catholic Church in the U.S. has been losing a great 
number of members seemingly because of a lack of modernisation.  A large number of 
former Catholics left because they were dissatisfied with Catholic teachings on abortion, 
homosexuality, and birth control, and also because of unhappiness with Catholicism‟s 
treatment of women (Pew Forum, 2009:9). 
 
The third, and final, interesting finding relevant to the argument of individual mobility is 
that the “single largest group in this adult population that has changed affiliation is made 
up of those who have changed from one Protestant denominational family to another” 
(Pew Forum, 2009:9).  About 15 percent of those individuals who were raised Protestant 
have changed their denomination, however, the most common reasons for such a change 
is moving to a new community or marrying someone from a different religious 
background.  Protestants are also least likely to change their denomination due to “a loss 
of belief in the religion‟s teachings” (Pew Forum, 2009:9). 
 
Protestantism in the U.S. has the highest retention rate of all major religions.  About 8 out 
of 10 adults who were raised Protestant are still Protestant while two-thirds of this group 
belong to the same denomination in which they were raised (Pew Forum, 2009:30).  The 
majority of Christian fundamentalists in the U.S. are Protestant denominations.  It is 
important to take this into account when a strategy of individual mobility is promoted to 
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deal with invidious comparisons.  As the Pew Forum shows, Protestants are most 
reluctant to completely change their religion, however, they are most likely to join a 
different denomination of their religion.  But then it should also be taken into account that 
there are so many denominations available for choice in their religion.  There are about 
33 000 Protestant denominations worldwide – about 4500 in the U.S. alone (Barrett, 
Kurian & Johnson, 2001:12).  No other religion offers such an array of options for their 
members as Protestantism does.  
 
According to Mark Silk, a Professor of religion in public life at Trinity College, major 
fluxes in religious affiliation is no new phenomena: “The sense that there is a huge 
amount of flux where there was not before is not accurate.  In the nineteenth century 
there was a huge amount of switching around and the establishment of new 
denominations” (Greene, 2009).  It seems as if the option of individual mobility has been 
around in religious circles for quite some time.  The sheer amount of denominations 
within the different religious groups not only allows the pursuit of the option of 
individual mobility, the growth of the number of religious denominations within the 
nineteenth century illustrates the existence of this strategy within the religious paradigm 
and the successful pursuit thereof. 
 
What this study has been able to knowingly, or unknowingly, illustrate is the fact that 
American adults often change from one religious affiliation to another but less often 
completely rid themselves of religion.  Many of those who fall within the unaffiliated 
population see themselves as being in between religions rather than completely without 
religion.  According to the Pew Forum (2009:8) about 4 out of 10 people within the 
unaffiliated population say that religion is still “somewhat important in their lives” while 
at least one in three of the unaffiliated claim to have not found the right religion yet.  
Thus, many people still leave the option open for joining or rejoining a religion one day 
(Pew Forum, 2009:8).   
 
A researcher at the Pew Forum explained the flux in religious affiliation quite accurately 
when he argued:  “You‟re seeing the free market at work. If people are dissatisfied they 
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will leave.”  This is a very important observation that should be kept in mind.  While 
Harris and Dawkins are keen promoters of the elimination of religion, the Pew Forum 
survey has illustrated the impossibility of such a reality.  What the survey illustrated was 
a “decrease in brand-loyalty” (Taylor, 2009).  But more importantly the survey illustrated 
that people do not move away from religion completely but rather prefer to replace their 
old religion with a new one (Taylor, 2009).  This survey illustrated most importantly that 
people generally need religion, and all that accompanies it, in their lives.  
 
3.3 Social Creativity 
The second option for dealing with invidious comparisons is social creativity.  This 
option is approached within the belief system of social change.  It is a group strategy to 
improve the position of the entire social group.  Tajfel and Turner (1979:43) describe 
social creativity as group members seeking for positive distinctiveness for the in-group 
“by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation.”  Three sub-options 
are identified by Tajfel and Turner under this heading and will be discussed in this 
section.  These are (a) comparing the in-group to the out-group on some new dimension; 
(b) changing the values assigned to the attributes of the group, so that comparisons which 
were previously negative are now perceived as positive; and (c) changing the out-group.  
 
It is important to note that religious fundamentalists often engage in social creativity to 
better their group‟s status.  There are several reasons for this.  Religious fundamentalists 
may feel that their identity is being undermined by the secular world and leads to lower 
status.  This will increase feelings of insecurity.  Due to single truth claims the group 
members cannot leave the group to join another in an effort to achieve higher status.  On 
the other hand, some religious fundamentalist groups care little what the secular world 
think of them because the secular world is illegitimate in their eyes.  All that matters is 
their own perception of their status.  Being chosen by God to do his will is enough to 
instate their superiority in relation to other groups (Herriot, 2007:34-36). 
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3.3.1 New Dimension of Comparison 
The first sub-option of social creativity is creating a new dimension of comparison.  
Research has established that groups tend to compare with others on a dimension that 
reflects favourably to the in-group.  This helps to achieve a sense of higher status and a 
positive sense of self for group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:43).  When the accepted 
dimension of comparison no longer reflects the in-group in a positive light, the in-group 
can change the dimension of comparison.  They can find a new dimension of comparison 
that would reflect them in a positive light, a dimension that would make them appear to 
be superior to the group of comparison.  The main problem that presents itself here is the 
problem of “legitimizing the value assigned to the new social products – first in the in-
group and then in the other groups involved” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:43).  A new 
dimension of comparison may threaten the superior position of the out-group and this can 
cause increased intergroup tension (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:43).  The very fact that the 
new dimension of comparison may threaten the superior position of the out-group would 
make it all the more difficult to legitimise this new dimension of comparison. 
 
The dimension of comparison can be changed for different reasons but it always involves 
a change in the most salient dimension of comparison.  Therefore, it is not an easy 
strategy to pursue and in history one can find only rare cases of instances where the most 
salient dimension of comparison was changed.  However, a few examples can be 
provided to illustrate instances where a social group successfully changed the most 
salient dimension of comparison. 
 
The first example is the case of Tikopia.  This tiny isolated island in the Southwest 
Pacific ocean covers an area of 1.8 square miles.  Through subsistence farming the 
peoples of Tikopia has been able to continuously occupy the island for almost 3000 
years.  The peoples of this island have constantly had to address two very important 
problems relating to their survival.  One is to supply sufficient food for the population 
and, two is to control the population as the island can only sustain a population of about 
1600 people (Diamond, 2005:287,286).  It is said that around 100 B.C. the Tikopians 
started an “intensive husbandry of pigs” (Diamond, 2005:292).  The pigs became a 
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luxury food for the Chiefs and one of the most important sources of proteins.  The pigs 
were not only sources of protein but also symbols of status and wealth, and were 
predominantly owned by the Chiefs (Firth, 1959:37).  Firth (1959:153) reports that “the 
possession of money in Tikopia was not regarded as a significant sign of wealth.  Wealth 
lay in the possession of goods.”  But due to an overall destruction of crops and arable 
land as a result of the presence of the pigs, a conscious decision was made to kill all the 
pigs around 1600 A.D. (Diamond, 2005:292).  This decision was made in order to ensure 
the continued survival of the Tikopians. 
 
During his fieldwork on the island Firth (1936:373) also made the observation that 
descent was considered much more important than wealth, especially in terms of 
marriage.  For instance, there was “a barrier on marriage between Chiefs and 
commoners” which was regulated by descent, not wealth (Firth, 1936:373).  Based on 
these observations it could well be argued that the Tikopians changed their dimension of 
comparison, or were rather forced to change their most salient dimension of comparison, 
for continued survival.  The status and wealth as previously symbolised by the pig were 
replaced by the importance of descent and family lineage. 
 
Another example is the case of Iceland which used to be self-governing.  In the early 
thirteenth century fighting broke out between the Chiefs belonging to the five leading 
families.  Of course, to become the ruler of Iceland was a position of great status and 
prestige and thus a very sought after position.  This fighting resulted in the killing of 
people and the burning of farms.  Eventually, in 1262 the Icelanders invited Norway‟s 
king Hakon Hakonarson to govern them.  The Icelandic Chiefs forfeited the position of 
ultimate ruler and this resulted in a change in the most salient dimension of comparison.  
From now on they would no longer compete for the prestigious position of ruler of 
Iceland.  The invitation to Norway‟s king to govern them was admittance that a distant 
king “was less of a danger to them, would leave them more freedom, and could not 
possibly plunge their land into such disorder as their own nearby Chiefs” (Diamond, 
2005:202-203). 
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Finding a religious example where there was a change in the most salient dimension of 
comparison however, proved to be more challenging as the dimension of comparison 
often remains within the religious paradigm.  But even if comparisons have certainly 
remained within the religious paradigm there is one example where a definite shift in the 
dimension of comparison took place.  The Peace of Westphalia brought about this new 
dimension of comparison between the Catholics and Protestants of the 17
th
 century.  A 
brief overview of the preceding Thirty Years‟ War and the role of religion within this war 
are necessary at this stage. 
 
3.3.1.1 The Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of Westphalia 
To comprehend the nature of the Thirty Years‟ War it is important to have an 
“appreciation of the close links between secular and religious issues” (Rabb, 1968:33).  
Rabb (1968:33) explains: “For baroque man religion and politics were cut from the same 
cloth, indeed the most intensely political issues were precisely the religious ones.”  It is 
with this background that we now turn to the Thirty Years‟ War and its impact on the 
Catholics and Protestants. 
 
Although the Thirty Years‟ War only started in 1618 when a group of Bohemian leaders 
launched a rebellion against the Hapsburgs in order to destroy the Holy Roman Empire, it 
is also important to briefly investigate the events leading up to the start of the war (Rabb, 
1968:vii).  The initial tensions that were to evolve into the Thirty Years‟ War can be 
traced all the way back to 1555 when the Peace of Augsburg established the principle of 
cujus region ejus religio (of whom the region of him the religion).  This principle 
permitted every prince to “enforce either the Catholic or the Lutheran faith in his lands so 
that subjects who could not conform must emigrate” (Rabb, 1968:15).  This principle also 
included a modification which stated that a conversion to Protestantism by any ruling 
prelate, abbot, bishop or archbishop will result in an immediate loss of the ruling position 
(Rabb, 1968:16).  Rabb (1968:15) explains that although the Peace of Augsburg “saved 
the theory of religious unity for each state” it destroyed similar prospects for the Empire. 
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Over the course of the following decades it became clear to both the Catholics and the 
Protestants that due to the fact that every state had to follow the religion of their prince 
gaining territory was of great importance to establishing the superiority of their faith.  
Thus, this became their most salient dimension of comparison.  As a result force became 
“the proof of true faith” (Rabb, 1968:16). 
 
The period between the Peace of Augsburg and the Bohemian rebellion was characterised 
by a tremendous growth in Protestantism and a revival of Catholicism.  Rabb (1968:11) 
explains that the first years of Reformation “had forced many of [the Catholic rulers] to 
make concessions to their Protestant subjects, so that, officially at least, there were more 
Protestant communities in Catholic countries than were Catholics in Protestant ones.”  
Differences and tensions within the Empire seemed to have multiplied (Rabb, 1968:vii).  
Especially between 1608 and 1610 the immense tension between the Catholics and 
Protestants began to show.  First the Union of Protestant princes was formed followed by 
the establishment of the League of Catholic princes (Rabb, 1968:xiii).  According to 
Rabb (1968:vii-viii) the formation of the Union of Protestant princes and the 
establishment of the League of Catholic princes was “seen as a crystallization of the two 
sides which were to fight as soon as the pretext of the Bohemian revolt presented itself.”  
Three events within this time are especially important.  The first event was the outbreak 
of a riot between Catholics and Protestants in 1608 at Donauwörth, a city on the Danube, 
which kept the Empire on the edge of disaster for months.  The second event was the 
insurrection in Bohemia in 1609 which “forced the Emperor to guarantee religious 
freedom in that country” (Rabb, 1968:17).  The third event was when the Duke of 
Cleves-Jülich died without heirs in 1610.  This caused tension when two possible 
claimants, one Catholic and one Protestant, were identified and the Emperor immediately 
ordered his troops to occupy the district (Rabb, 1968:17). 
 
In 1618, as a result of increasing Catholic pressure, there was a revolt in Bohemia and the 
Protestant Union sent their troops to support the cause.  This revolt initiated the Thirty 
Years‟ War (Rabb, 1968:xiv).  A host of constant conflicts in the Empire ensued over the 
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next thirty years.  Some were more religiously motivated than others but in essence there 
was a struggle for territory and the establishment of either Catholicism or Protestantism. 
 
The Bohemian War (1618-27) revolved around the dispute over the throne of Bohemia – 
a predominantly Protestant kingdom.  The Habsburgs claimed that “the crown fell by 
heredity to the Holy Roman Empire” (Buisseret, 1969:92).  In 1620 the imperial armies 
entered Bohemia and by 1627 Bohemia was the possession of the Habsburgs and 
Catholicism was established as the only permitted religion (Buisseret, 1969:94). 
 
In the Danish War (1625-29) the focus fell on the Rhineland where the Habsburgs also 
enjoyed great success when they were recognised as the ruler over this region.  The 
Emperor Ferdinand took advantage of this position and issued the „edict of restitution‟ 
which stated that all properties seized since 1552 shall be returned to the old church.  
Through this Ferdinand was able to re-establish the power of Catholicism in northern and 
north-western Germany (Buisserat, 1969:94-95). 
 
The Swedish Phase (1630-34) of the war was retaliation by Gustaves Adolphus of 
Sweden to “save the [German] provinces from Habsburg tyranny” and to re-establish 
Protestantism in the region (Buisserat, 1969:95-96). 
 
The French Phase (1635-48), also the last phase before the Peace of Westphalia, was not 
so much concerned with the religious aspects as seen in the previous conflicts.  In the 
early sixteen-forties it became evident that the participators were ready to negotiate a 
peace-settlement (Buisserat, 1969:97-98). 
 
In 1648 a number of peace treaties were signed and became known as the Peace of 
Westphalia (Rabb, 1968:xvii).  The most important settlements relating to religion was, 
first of all, the abandoning of the principle of cujus regio ejus religio.  Subjects were now 
allowed freedom of worship except in the hereditary Habsburg lands (Buisserat, 
1969:98).  It was also established that all imperial institutions were, from then on, “to be 
composed on a footing of religious equality” (Steinberg, 1966:82).  Another important 
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development was the independence of Estates.  The Emperor stated that “all Estates 
should be admitted as fully qualified representatives of the Empire and as independent 
members of the society of European states” (Steinberg, 1966:78).  In other words, Estates 
were granted full sovereignty.  According to Steinberg (1966:83) the Peace of Westphalia 
“marked a definite step towards the separation of politics and religion.  Politics became 
secularized, religion was to be left to the conscience of the individual.”  
 
The Thirty Years‟ War is viewed by many as “the last of the religious wars” (Rabb, 
1968:vii).  Rabb (1968:18) argues: “After the expenditure of so much human life to so 
little purpose… they rejected religion as an object to fight for and found others.”  In other 
words, they changed the most salient dimension of comparison and found a new one.  
Rabb (1968:4) argues that the discord continued between the two faiths “but utter[ed] 
itself no longer in bloody conflict.”  According to Rabb (1968:4) “while Catholics and 
Protestants maintained their earlier zeal for their faith, their convictions of the truth of 
their opinions and the errors of their opponents were of a kind which, in our time, we 
seek in vain, even in men of most rigid beliefs.” 
 
3.3.2 Changing the Rankings 
The second sub-option of social creativity is to change the rankings.  This option involves 
the rejection or reversal of the established value system by the in-group.  This means that 
the main characteristic that used to have a negative connotation is now perceived as 
positive by the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:43).  The example provided by Tajfel and 
Turner (1979:43) is the classic „Black is beautiful‟.  In this case the main characteristic 
was the race of the group.  The negative connotation attributed to this characteristic by 
out-groups was rejected and the in-group attributed a positive connotation to the very 
same characteristic. 
 
In the secular and „modern‟ world it is often the case that religious fundamentalists are 
viewed as backward, outdated, or ill-fitted for modern social structures.  Therefore, there 
is a general negative connotation to those individuals or groups who are classified as 
religious fundamentalists.  Of course, being a religious fundamentalist requires the 
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individual to return to the fundamentals, in other words, it is a deliberate failure to 
modernise.  This anti-modernisation attitude is therefore central to their identity but also 
the main point of criticism from the secular world.  Thus, religious fundamentalists find 
themselves in a dilemma and are presented with two alternatives to change the rankings.  
The first, but also the less desirable alternative, is to modernise their religion in order to 
have the entire religion viewed by others as higher up in the rankings of all collective 
religions.  But this alternative poses many problems of which the biggest problem is 
probably the fact that these religious fundamentalists will have to completely change their 
religious identity as they would have to let go of the central aspect of their identity – their 
fundamentals.  The second, and probably more appealing alternative, is to turn the 
characteristics which previously had a negative connotation into a positive connotation.  
These two alternatives provided for changing the rankings will be discussed in the light 
of Christian fundamentalists in the following paragraphs. 
 
3.3.2.1 Modernise 
Religious fundamentalist groups in general are questioned and threatened by a more 
powerful order – the secular world.  According to Elizondo (1985:96-97) the dominant 
order often tries to help the group considered to be inferior “to „improve‟ by ceasing to be 
who they are” and become more like the dominant groups, in other words, they need to 
modernise in order to fit in. 
 
In Hegel‟s ‘The Phenomenology of Mind’ (1807) he promotes a message of 
modernisation as a cure for the alienation felt by so many people.  According to Hegel we 
live in a world that is “continually re-creating itself” (Armstrong, 2004:93).  Armstrong 
(2004:93-94) sums it up well when she states: “Hegel envisaged a dialectical process in 
which human beings were constantly engaged in the destruction of past ideas that had 
once been sacred and incontrovertible.”  Hegel envisaged a world that was constantly 
undergoing a process of evolution, a world that was striving towards new truths and not 
constantly returning to the fundamentals (Armstrong, 2004:94). 
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According to Armstrong (2006:295) religion should not be stagnant, it should evolve just 
as its surroundings evolve.  This was also the view of the Axial sages.  Armstrong 
(2006:295) writes: “When they [the Axial sages] confronted aggression in their own 
traditions, they did not pretend that it was not there but worked vigorously to change their 
religion, rewriting and reorganizing their rituals and scriptures in order to eliminate the 
violence that accumulated over the years.”  Religion is not a sacred entity that should be 
kept untouched for the sake of tradition.  We need to re-evaluate and ask probing 
questions in order to find out whether our beliefs are still applicable to modern times – is 
it still relevant in helping us deal with the current state of the world?  Brümmer (2007:47-
48) promotes the same idea as Armstrong in terms of modernisation, he writes: “the faith 
of a religious tradition needs to be continually re-focused, re-interpreted and re-
conceptualized in different ways in order to remain relevant for the changing demands of 
life.”  Brümmer (2007:44) argues that “religious traditions are not monolithic and 
immutable systems of thought but allows for various ways of understanding the meaning 
and significance of life and the world.”  In other words, religious traditions allow for 
modernisation, it almost necessitates it.  In order to remain relevant and adequate religion 
“require[s] translation, re-conceptualization and re-interpretation” (Brümmer, 2007:46).  
Brümmer (2007:48) argues that religious tradition needs to “address the issues and 
demands which arise in the ever changing situations in which believers find themselves.”   
 
According to Kimball (2008:109) freedom of intellectual thinking and honest enquiry 
should be encouraged within religious traditions.  But Kimball (2008:69) argues, we 
should not expect such a questioning of truth, at least not within Christianity.  He states 
that his experience “reinforces the view that most Christians don‟t grow up learning to 
ask basic questions about their own sacred texts” (Kimball, 2008:69).  The possible 
reason for this is that to a religious individual who believes to adhere to the teachings of 
the only authentic religion, it would be an absolute sin to even entertain the possibility of 
their religion not being the only „true‟ religion.  It would simply be considered as George 
Orwell‟s (1949) concept of a „thoughtcrime‟. 
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Criticism of the Bible has rarely been welcomed by the Christian fundamentalists.  This 
was already evident when a group of Anglican clergyman started to publish „Essays and 
Reviews‟ which contained the latest biblical criticism.  This group of clergymen became 
known as „The Higher Criticism‟ (Armstrong, 2004:95).  In this case it becomes evident 
that Richard Hofstadter had a point when he claimed that “single-minded commitment to 
one idea inspires hostility towards liberal inquiry” (Boone, 1989:6). 
 
According to Dawkins (2006:42) the fundamental mistake that society makes is to accept 
that “religious faith is especially vulnerable to offence and should be protected by an 
abnormally thick wall of respect.”  Offence is much more easily taken when arguments 
surrounding religion are engaged in and therefore the majority of humans refuse to 
challenge the beliefs of their fellow adherents.  This makes the process of modernising 
religion an uphill struggle. 
 
According to Harris (2006:18) religion can only be modernised once adherents are 
willing and able to ignore at least part of their teachings.  For instance, the Bible teaches 
the stoning of men, women and children for a variety of crimes.  The Bible also contains 
the following passage in Deuteronomy 13:1: “Whatever I am now commanding you, you 
must keep and observe, adding nothing to it, taking nothing away.”  Although the stoning 
of people for crimes committed has gone out of fashion, Christians are still caught in a 
dilemma.  It should be added that the dilemma is so much worse for Christian 
fundamentalists who believe in the literal truth of the Bible.  How can they modernise 
their religion if it requires ignoring certain parts of their holy book?  Harris (2006:18) 
sums it up well: “This is a problem for „moderation‟ in religion: it has nothing 
underwriting it other than the unacknowledged neglect of the letter of the divine law.” 
 
In the light of the previous paragraphs two common problems pertaining to 
modernisation can be identified.  The first is that people are not encouraged to question 
their holy texts or religious traditions as single truth claims have often overshadowed any 
thought of doubt (Kimball, 2008:68).  The second problem is that even if the individual 
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was moved to ask questions an obvious lack of objectivity has often hampered the 
process.  Therefore genuine „truth‟ is often elusive (Kimball, 2008:76). 
 
The refusal of Christian fundamentalists to incorporate secular beliefs has sparked a 
reactionary stubbornness that has deemed modernisation within this specific religious 
group all the more problematic.  Most religious fundamentalist groups choose to close 
their boundaries and limit contact to the modern world.  They prefer to be exclusive while 
declaring their singular claim to truth (Fisher, 1999:19).  Thus, it is not so simple to 
persuade these religious fundamentalist groups to modernise.  It is, the very act of 
modernisation that made them close off their boundaries and grab hold of their 
fundamental beliefs.  The very goal of fundamentalists “is to protect their religious 
identity from modernity and secularists” (Fox & Shmuel, 2004:85). 
 
Seul (1999) identifies another problem concerning modernisation.  He argues that 
“religious groups often demand a high level of commitment from their members, so that 
it may be extremely difficult to shed one‟s religious identity once it is established” (Seul, 
1999:559).  According to Seul this is one of the main reasons for the prevalence of 
religious conflict.  But it is also one of the key reasons why modernisation may be 
problematic as an option for dealing with invidious comparisons. 
 
The beliefs of Christian fundamentalists are based on the five fundamentals as already 
mentioned in Chapter Two.  If any of these fundamentals are challenged the Christian 
fundamentalists perceive it as a threat to their identity.  Doubting the core of their belief 
system is not an option for them and thus they rarely, if ever, question their own beliefs 
(Herriot, 2007:54).  Anything that may pose a challenge to their beliefs is simply false.  
According to Dawkins (2006:321) religious fundamentalism “teaches us not to change 
our minds.”  Therefore, religious fundamentalism stands in complete opposition with the 
concept of modernisation.  Thus, the beliefs, values and norms on which the 
fundamentalists‟ social identity rests “are highly unlikely to change in the face of 
conflicting evidence” – especially if this evidence is devised by the secular world which 
is seen as illegitimate in the eyes of the religious fundamentalist (Herriot, 2007:55). 
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3.3.2.2 Transforming the Negative to the Positive 
According to Elizondo (1985:54) every human society “develop[s] ways of accepting and 
welcoming some persons while rejecting and downgrading others [and] every society 
develops its own ways of determining in-groups and out-groups, the normal and the 
abnormal, the successful and the failures.”  These categories will be found in every 
human society and unfortunately for the Christian fundamentalist they found themselves 
at the back end of every category as determined by the secular world. 
 
The in-group has the option of redefining the values attached to the group attributes.  A 
previously negative attribute can be redefined as a positive attribute.  This can enable the 
group “to feel superior in terms of their most valued characteristic” (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988:57).  Elizondo (1985) provides the framework for Christians where a previously 
negative aspect of the social group can be transformed into a positive aspect.  Firstly, 
Elizondo (1985:47) introduces the Gospel Matrix which is based on the premise that all 
people “still must be judged by the word of the Gospels.”  Secondly, Elizondo (1985:53) 
argues: “What the world rejects, God chooses as his very own.”  Elizondo‟s argument is 
based on, what he refers to as, worldly rejection-divine election. 
 
Elizondo (1985:64) argues that “the kingdom of the Father offers a new basis for any 
given society.”  Within the existing social structures God offers a new basis for ranking 
social groups.  God promotes a complete reversal of the existing hierarchy for suddenly it 
is the backward, the deprived, and the poor who now rank at the very top.  In this context, 
Elizondo distinguishes between three types of poverty: material poverty, psychological 
poverty, and cultural-spiritual poverty.  Material poverty refers to “the lack of the 
fundamental necessities of life” (Elizondo, 1985:95).  Psychological poverty refers to low 
self-image or even self-hatred as a result of a lack of acceptance, understanding, love or 
esteem.  This is coupled with feelings of inferiority based on “the standards and norms 
projected by those in control” (Elizondo, 1985:95).  Cultural-spiritual poverty “is the 
deprivation not only of goods or status, but of the very humanity of a racially and 
culturally determined group,” in other words, the group “has been robbed of its humanity 
by the group that does the labeling” (Elizondo, 1985:96). 
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Two types of poverty are relevant when discussing Christian fundamentalists, namely 
psychological poverty and spiritual-cultural poverty.  It is also important to note that 
„those in control‟ and „the group that does the labeling‟ is represented by the dominant 
secular world.  First of all, due to the established standards and norms Christian 
fundamentalists often lack the acceptance or understanding of the secular world.  This 
leads to possible feelings of inferiority and a lack of self-esteem which results in 
psychological poverty.  Second, the secular world often labels Christian fundamentalists 
as backward and thus succeeds to deprive the group of their humanity which results in 
cultural-spiritual poverty.  For the provided reasons these two types of poverty – 
psychological and cultural-spiritual – are intrinsically part of the Christian fundamentalist 
identity, especially in the developed and secular world. 
 
But all is not lost for the Christian fundamentalist for Luke 6:20 proclaims: “God blesses 
you who are poor, for the Kingdom of God is yours.”  For this reason Elizondo (1985:91) 
argues: “What human beings reject, God chooses as his very own.”  Within the Christian 
scriptures one can find many signs and suggestions that being poor in any way, or being 
rejected should not be considered negative but rather as something profoundly positive.  
For instance, the protagonist of the Christian religion, Jesus Christ, identified with the 
most rejected of society.  In his continued identification with the poor and rejected of 
society, Jesus “entered and left human society as a reject” (Elizondo, 1985:55). In the 
eyes of society Jesus Christ was considered a reject.  But Jesus rejected rejection and 
“enable[d] his followers to do likewise” (Elizondo, 1985:92). 
 
Jesus cared greatly for the most rejected of society and according to Elizondo (1985:55) 
Jesus‟ love for the most rejected “is one of the greatest constants of his ministry.”  But 
Jesus provides an explanation for why he favours the rejected.  For him “it is evident that 
the poor, the little ones, and the simple people will be the first ones to understand the love 
and wisdom of the father; the wise and intelligent of „this world‟ will be excluded” 
(Elizondo, 1985:56).  Those who are considered inferior by society assumes the top 
position on the social hierarchy in the eyes of God for they are able to grasp something 
Religion, Intolerance, and Social Identity 
63 
 
that the wise and intelligent, also considered the secular of this world, fails to understand.  
This „understanding‟ will also lead to the ultimate prize: access to Heaven – being chosen 
by God himself.  God invites “especially those who have been rejected” into his kingdom 
(Elizondo, 1985:33).  In God‟s eyes the only thing that counts in his kingdom “is what is 
revealed in the heart that opens itself to God… this is the only criterion for 
belongingness” (Elizondo, 1985:62).  However, those who fail to understand or fail to 
open their hearts to God will be excluded.  They will fail to gain access to Heaven and, 
according to Christian teachings, will burn in Hell for all eternity. 
 
In essence God‟s message to the poor and rejected are that they should reject rejection as 
Jesus did for they are the chosen ones because they opened their hearts to God and this is 
His only criterion for belongingness.  In this way God establishes the superiority of His 
dedicated followers to all the rest and “offers a new basis for any given society” 
(Elizondo, 1985:64).  According to Elizondo (1985:100) “it is evident from the scriptures 
that God chooses the outcasts of the world – not exclusively, but certainly in a 
preferential way.” 
 
The cross that once was a symbol of curse has, through the help of Christian faith, been 
transformed into “a symbol of divine blessing” (Elizondo, 1985:106).  They succeeded to 
transform a previous negative symbol into a symbol of hope.  The Christian religion, in 
this case, succeeded to change something negative into something positive and the 
Christian fundamentalists might be able to transform themselves in a similar fashion.  
Through the words of God it is possible for Christian fundamentalists to challenge the 
existing social norms of acceptability based on power and prestige (Elizondo, 1985:93).  
Therefore it is possible for Christian fundamentalists to change the rankings. 
 
3.3.3 Changing the Out-Group 
The third sub-option of social creativity is to change the out-group.  In order to compare 
favourably to the out-group the in-group should avoid comparisons with high status 
groups.  Where comparisons with high status groups can lead to feelings of inferiority, 
comparisons with low status groups can endorse a feeling of relative superiority (Tajfel & 
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Turner, 1979:43-44).  Therefore, when the in-group changes their out-group it usually 
involves them choosing an out-group with lower status to compare themselves to.  Self-
esteem is higher where comparisons are made with low-status groups (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979:44).  To illustrate their point Tajfel and Turner (1979) use the example of African 
Americans in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s.  They found that “self-
esteem was higher among blacks who made self-comparisons with other blacks rather 
than whites” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:44).  In other words, African Americans had to 
change their out-group in order to compare favourably and, at the same time, enhance 
their self-esteem.   
 
In the following sections two examples will be provided.  The first example involves a 
scenario where the in-group changed its out-group.  The Christian fundamentalists in the 
United States will be used to illustrate such an example.  The transition of colonial 
America to independent, secular United States of America had quite an impact on 
religious social groups, specifically due to the fact that a new out-group surfaced – the 
secular state.  Another alternative that will be explored separately is the creation of a 
global collective consciousness as promoted by Armstrong (2006).  This alternative 
involves doing away with all out-groups and creating an all-inclusive universal in-group.  
The viability of this alternative will be explored in the relevant section but first the 
example of Christian fundamentalists and the secular state will be explored.   
 
3.3.3.1 Religious Fundamentalists in the United States 
As will be illustrated in section 3.4 dealing with social competition, colonial America 
was characterised by competition mainly between different Christian denominations.  
Thus, the out-group was a religious group of a different denomination.  But after the 
revolution and the establishment of an independent state, the United States of America, 
there suddenly was another out-group in the mix. 
 
Even though a large majority of the population of colonial America was weary of mixing 
church and state, the gradual effects of secularism on religion were not welcomed by all 
religious groups.  In the new independent state it was established that the church would 
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have no role in the affairs of the state.  The Constitution of the United States would also 
have no mention of God (Harris, 2007:19). 
 
According to Finke and Stark (1992:59) by the start of the revolution “the era of harsh 
religious persecution in the colonies had ended… Religious toleration prevailed in fact, if 
not yet in statute.”  In the post-independence federal government “the state would be 
separated from all religious entanglements” (Finke et al, 1992:59).  The United States of 
America was to be a secular state.  In the aftermath of the establishment of this secular 
state it was noted that there was a gradual decline in religion - churches were losing 
numbers (Finke et al, 1992:56).  Whether this decline was caused by secularism or by a 
host of other factors or events is not quite sure but some religious groups blamed 
secularism.  These religious groups had identified a new out-group, namely the secular 
state.  From then on, they would compare themselves to the secular state in order to 
establish their own superiority. 
 
It was specifically during the twentieth century and the rise of Christian fundamentalism 
in the United States that the schisms between the „secular world‟ and the „religious 
fundamentalist world‟ became prominent.  The secular world was purely driven by 
science and liberal values where the religious world was quite the opposite.  Political 
issues arose where these two worlds were visibly in direct contrast with each other.  The 
secular world promoted liberal values such as pro-abortion, anti-death penalty, equal 
rights to women, the teaching of evolution, a removal of prayer from schools, and also 
the promotion of gay rights.  In contrast, the religious world were in favour of the death 
penalty, against abortion, lesser rights for women, the banning of evolution and replacing 
it with the teaching of creationism, compulsory prayer in schools, and finally, no rights 
for gays as.  According to Armstrong (2004:ix) the fundamentalists were “adamantly 
opposed to many of the most positive values of modern society… democracy, pluralism, 
religious toleration, free speech, [and] the separation of church and state.” 
 
It becomes clear that religious fundamentalists created an alternative to the secular or, as 
fundamentalists refer to it, “the fallen world” (Marty & Appleby, 1995:429).  In the 
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words of Armstrong (2004:201): “Fundamentalists were beginning to retreat from 
mainstream society to create countercultures that reflected the way they thought things 
ought to be.”  In order to strengthen this world they also established “alternative 
institutions” such as independent churches, clinics, schools, and radio stations to promote 
their version of the truth (Marty et al, 1995:451). 
 
Although the initial approach of the religious fundamentalists was withdrawal from 
mainstream society, the late 1970s and 1980s brought forth a new approach.  During this 
time the fundamentalists fought back by abandoning their initial passive approach and 
rather mobilising their members to engage in the politics of the secular world.  They were 
attempting to „convert‟ secular United States and establish religious United States as the 
dominant state model.  To some extent they have achieved success in this regard.  One 
should not forget that the U.S. is one of the most religious industrialised countries in the 
world.  Armstrong (2004:315) explains: “[Religious fundamentalists] had learned how to 
conduct themselves in the political arena; they had enfranchised themselves, and, to an 
extent, resacralized American politics in a way that never ceases to amaze the more 
secular countries of Europe.” 
 
To establish the superiority of the religious world, the religious fundamentalists would 
often „celebrate‟ a blow to secular U.S as a victory for the religious U.S.  For instance, 
the atrocious terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were explained by reverends Pat 
Robertson and Jerry Falwell, two prominent spokesmen of the religious fundamentalist 
world, as “divine judgment on a secular society that tolerates homosexuals and abortion” 
(Hitchens, 2007:32).  According to the religious fundamentalists it is obvious that God 
carries the same contempt for the secular world as the religious fundamentalist world 
does.  The attacks of September 11 confirmed, in some twisted way, the superiority of the 
religious fundamentalist world, for in God‟s eyes, they were the preferred world. 
 
The religious fundamentalists of the U.S. have become a force to be reckoned with.  They 
have become a social group with widespread appeal that presents a genuine alternative to 
the secular world.  They have created a world where abortion is banned and doctors who 
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are willing to perform such an act will be executed; a world where homosexuals are not 
welcome; a word where the woman knows her place, and where the husband is the head 
of the wife; a world where evolution is discarded and creationism reigns supreme; a 
world where schools allow prayer and Bible teaching; and finally, a world where there is 
no separation between church and state. 
 
This section started out by arguing that an in-group will choose an out-group of lower 
status to compare themselves to.  An out-group of lower status will allow a favourable 
comparison and the establishment of the superiority of the in-group whereas comparisons 
with high status groups will cause feelings of inferiority.  This makes the example of 
Christian fundamentalists and secular U.S. a very interesting example.  The reason for 
this is that most out-groups, especially the secular world, consider Christian 
fundamentalists as being backward and therefore a social group of lower status.  On the 
other hand, most social groups, with the exception religious fundamentalists, consider the 
secular world as a very high status group that ranks high on the social hierarchy.   
 
Thus, the question is how Christian fundamentalists can compare themselves with secular 
U.S. and not feel inferior as a social group?  Armstrong (2004) provides the answer.  She 
argues that these fundamentalists have rarely considered themselves inferior to any other 
social group because they created a world that is favoured by God.  Even when they feel 
ostracised by mainstream society they still have “a sense of confidence and superiority” 
for they have “privileged information, denied to the secularists… [they] know what is 
really going on” (Armstrong, 2004:217).  By applying this reasoning, Christian 
fundamentalists are able to compare themselves to social groups of higher status and at 
the same time retain their sense of superiority within the social hierarchy. 
 
3.3.3.2 Creating a Global Collective Consciousness 
Another alternative is not to change the out-group but to do away with it completely by 
uniting all social groups into one universal in-group.  In the words of Karen Armstrong 
(2006:398), we need to create a global collective consciousness.  Pastor William Sloane 
Coffin, as quoted from Kimball (2008:212), is in agreement.  He argues: “The challenge 
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today is to seek a unity that celebrates diversity… What is intolerable is for difference to 
become idolatrous… Human beings are fully human only… when they recognize that all 
people have more in common than they have in conflict” (Kimball, 2008:212). 
 
Specifically within the religious context this option is supposed to be quite appealing.  To 
narrow it down even more, in the Christian community such an option of a single 
universal in-group should carry great appeal for the Bible clearly asks of all Christians to 
love thy neighbour as thyself.  Yet the Christian community remains divided.  In-groups 
and out-groups have historically been created within denominations of the very same 
religion.  It is based on this background that Allport (1954:447) argues: “People have 
failed to learn that the essence of religion is not self-justification, self-support, but rather 
humility, self-negotiation, and love of neighbour.” 
 
It is however possible to argue that religious individuals have not failed to learn love of 
thy neighbor, they have simply chosen to apply this concept very exclusively.  Since the 
concept of „thy neighbour‟ was promoted it has been riddled with exclusivity.  For 
instance, it has been argued by anthropologist John Hartung, as cited in Dawkins 
(2006:288), that in the context of the Bible, Jesus‟ in-group was limited to Jews and when 
Jesus spoke of „thy neighbour‟ he referred only to his fellow Jews (Dawkins, 2006:288).  
Unfortunately, this is what the concept of „thy neighbour‟ has turned into.  For Christians 
„thy neighbour‟ often refers to only fellow Christians.  In many cases it has become even 
more exclusive where „thy neighbour‟ only refers to fellow Protestants or is even 
restricted to fellow Lutherans only. 
 
In terms of importance, the concept of love for „thy neighbour‟ can, through selective 
reading, be demoted to a position of lesser importance than other teachings of the Bible. 
This problem is often encountered in the religious fundamentalist community.  According 
to Herriot (2007:93) a very clear feature of religious fundamentalism is selectivity.  This 
refers to the selective reading fundamentalists engage in when reading the Bible.  For 
instance, they can choose a topic such as homosexuality, which is not mentioned often in 
the Bible, and turn it into one of the focal points of their religion.  In contrast, love for 
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„thy neighbour‟, which is a fairly common theme throughout the New Testament, can be 
demoted in terms of importance. 
 
The issues of exclusivity and selective reading, specifically in the religious 
fundamentalist case, create massive problems for the creation of a global collective 
consciousness.  But apart from these particular issues, there is also the issue of the basic 
human condition.  As humans we struggle to extend our loyalties to a large, inclusive in-
group.  According to Allport (1954:43) the larger the circle of inclusion grows, the 
weaker the in-group grows.  Brewer (1999:434) is in agreement, she explains: “In-group 
loyalty, and its concomitant depersonalized trust and cooperation, is most effectively 
engaged by relatively small, distinctive groups or social categories.”  This implies that 
creating a global collective consciousness probably poses one of the greatest challenges 
as “world loyalty is the most difficult to achieve” (Allport, 1954:43).  Allport (1954:43) 
is of opinion that “there seems to be special difficulty in fostering an in-group out of an 
entity as embracing as mankind.” 
 
Although the creation of a global collective consciousness presents an inspiring ideal 
there are, what seems to be, many immovable stumbling blocks along the way.  Thus, we 
need to arrive at the unfortunate conclusion that creating a global collective 
consciousness seems highly unlikely.  
 
3.4 Social Competition 
The third option for dealing with invidious comparisons is social competition.  The act of 
social competition is another option based on the value system of social change, meaning 
it is a group strategy to improve the status of the entire in-group.  According to Horowitz 
(2000:143-144) the ultimate goal for any group member is to achieve a positive sense of 
self.  To achieve this, groups compare with each other in order to ultimately achieve a 
positive group evaluation.  This often results in an in-group engaging in direct 
competition with the out-group “on dimensions consensually valued by both groups” 
(Hogg & Abrams, 1988:57-58).  The competition can revolve around scarce resources of 
economic, political, or social nature, in order for the in-group to establish positive 
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distinctiveness from the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:44).  Seul (1999:557) explains: 
“The process of intergroup competition produces a competitive dynamic in which groups 
attempt to enhance their identities relative to other groups.”  To achieve a position of high 
status on the social hierarchy the in-group may try to “reverse the relative positions” of 
themselves and the out-group on a significant dimension (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:44).  If 
the in-group is successful there will be a change in the social hierarchy.  Competition has 
thus become a viable option for dealing with invidious comparisons as it allows a group 
to perhaps attain positive evaluation.  Tajfel and Turner (1979:44) suggest that social 
groups “can only be evaluated comparatively” and thus competition becomes imminent.  
Tajfel and Turner (1979:44) are of the opinion that, due to its nature of focusing on the 
distribution of scarce resources, direct competition may result in conflict and antagonism 
between the relevant groups. 
 
As many social groups have competed in the past, different religions or denominations of 
the same religion have often competed for scarce resources as well.  In history this has 
involved competition for territory, political power, prominent religious positions, and of 
course, competition for the amount of converts or number of church members.  Colonial 
America provides a good case study for religious competition, most notably competition 
for the establishment of an American bishop, but also competition for political power 
within the separate colonies.  In colonial America the dominant faiths “benefited from 
superior economic and political resources” (Pyle & Davidson, 2003:63).  A clear ranking 
of religious groups emerged during the eighteenth century.  Firmly established at the top 
of the social hierarchy were those who had access to economic and political resources 
(Pyle et al, 2003:65).  In effect, competition for political power was also competition for 
a higher ranking in the social hierarchy of colonial America.  These examples will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.4.1 Congregationalists vs. Anglicans: A Bishop for Colonial America 
Massachusetts provides an example of the role of religious competition for the 
establishment of a bishop in America in the eighteenth century.  In the first stages of 
settlement in this colony only orthodox Congregationalists were allowed the privilege to 
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vote or take up a position in office. Settlers who did not conform to the Orthodox Church 
were sent out of the colony.  In effect, Congregationalism became the established religion 
not only in Massachusetts, but in the whole of New England – with the exception of 
Rhode Island.  But by the eighteenth century the Anglican Church was making prominent 
advances in Massachusetts and seemed to threaten Congregationalist control (Pyle et al, 
2003:62).  Up to that time the Anglicans were “considered a dissenting religion” in most 
of the New England colonies (Bonomi, 1986:54).  In Massachusetts specifically, 
Anglicans were “initially banned from the settlement and denied citizenship rights and 
religious freedoms” (Pyle et al, 2004:62).  But now, with the sudden growth of 
Anglicanism within the colony English officials were pressuring colonial officials to 
favour the Church of England – an Anglican institution.  It was already in this early stage 
that competition between the Congregationalists and Anglicans became evident.  
 
It was during this time that the idea to establish an Anglican bishop in America took 
form.  Of course the Congregationalists, and also other denominations in colonial 
America, were firmly against such an establishment.  The issue was not simply the 
establishment of a bishop in America, but the possible power such a bishop might exert 
over Americans of all religions.  It was feared that the establishment of a bishop will 
drastically strengthen the Anglican community to such an extent that they could 
challenge the superiority of the religious social groups ranked above them in the social 
hierarchy.  A Presbyterian leader was quoted saying: “What we dread is their (Anglicans) 
political power and their courts” (Bonomi, 1986:200).  What was feared was the 
possibility of a combined state and church in America as it was widely believed that 
“bishops endangered civil as well as religious liberties” (Bonomi, 1986:200). 
 
In order to strengthen the position of the Church of England in New England the church 
appointed ministers in area where Congregationalist clergy already served.  The Anglican 
Church in New England also used their financial capabilities “to lure Congregationalist 
ministers to the Anglican community through the promise of a better salary” (Pyle et al, 
2003:62).  The Congregationalists responded by making it their mission to establish new 
Congregationalist churches all over New England in order to “head off Anglican 
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advances” (Pyle et al, 2003:62).  Competition for adherents intensified between the 
denominations to the point where these churches placed a renewed emphasis on church 
doctrine (Bonomi, 1986:40). 
 
To counter the threat of the establishment of an American bishop Congregationalists 
started to work together with Presbyterians in the middle colonies as both these 
denominations feared a loss of civil and religious liberties with the establishment of a 
bishop.  The Congregationalists of America also formed close ties with the 
Congregationalists of England.  This alliance played a very important role in continually 
defeating the efforts of the Anglicans to send a bishop to America (Pyle et al, 2003:62). 
 
In the meantime the Church of England employed several strategies to improve the 
numbers and influence of Anglicans in America.  England sent over office holders who 
had a “notably Anglican orientation” in an attempt to make the colonies “as much like the 
mother country as possible” (Bonomi, 1986:200).  The appointment of Anglicans to 
provincial councils and judicial offices were becoming noticeable (Bonomi, 1986:201).  
Leading Anglicans wanted to Anglicize their governments by bringing it under the royal 
charters and in effect strengthen the Church of England.  This course of action was most 
notable in the colonies of Rhode Island and Connecticut.  But these attempts were 
strongly fought by those who feared “that the Church of England might thereby gain 
preferential status” (Bonomi, 1986:201). 
 
Another strategy employed by the Church of England to improve their position in 
America was to encourage the immigration of Anglican clergymen to America.  This 
encouragement took the form of “university fellowships with seven-year colonial service 
clauses, government subsidies for transportation, and a form of clerical „impressment‟ 
that sent ministers abroad for five-year stints” (Bonomi, 1986:31).  The clergymen that 
eventually came to America were confronted by competing denominations and, above all, 
the absence of any bishop “to ordain and discipline ministers for the Anglican, Lutheran, 
and Reformed Churches” (Bonomi, 1986:40).  
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Specifically in New England tensions between the Anglicans - backed by the Church of 
England - and the Congregationalists were reaching new heights.  The establishment of a 
bishop in America was fought vigorously by the Congregationalists of New England, 
more specifically, those of Massachusetts.  The situation is summed up well by the 
historian of King‟s Chapel:  
“The standing grievance between the two parties was in the fact that each 
really claimed supremacy of the same kind. Congregationalism was 
practically the established Church of Massachusetts… Face to face with this 
institution, to which the great majority of the people still belonged… now 
stood a few members of the powerful establishment of the mother country” 
(Osgood, 1958:118). 
 
In the end the Congregationalists, along with their supporters in England and their 
Presbyterian allies in the middle colonies, were able to head off the advances of the 
Anglicans in America and the Church of England.  At the same time the 
Congregationalists were able to establish their superiority as a social group through direct 
social competition. 
 
3.4.2 Virginia: Competing for Political Power 
Apart from the competition between Congregationalists and Anglicans for the 
establishment of a bishop in America, there were also other states in which competition 
of a religious nature took form.  In eighteenth century Virginia competition for political 
power had strong religious undertones. 
 
In Virginia Anglicanism became the established religion early on in the settlement stages.  
As in many other American colonies, gaining an upper hand religiously often translated 
into gaining an upper hand politically.  The Anglicans were, however, reluctant to extend 
any political freedoms “to those outside the Anglican communion” (Pyle et al, 2003:61).  
They heartily protected “the hegemony of [their] ecclesiastical establishment” by actively 
suppressing any dissenters (Pyle et al, 2003:61). 
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But the Great Awakening of the eighteenth century had a tremendous affect on the lower 
classes of Virginia.  The result was the rapid growth of Presbyterian and Baptist 
congregations.  The Anglicans suddenly feared that they would be successfully 
challenged by these growing congregations not only as the established religion of the 
colony, but also as the holders of political power.  These Baptists and Presbyterians were 
heartily trying to convert as many people as possible to their congregation in order to 
challenge the power of the Anglicans.  In the process they managed to convert some 
vestrymen.  The Anglican response was to dissolve several vestries “for including non-
Anglican vestrymen” (Pyle et al, 2003:61).   
 
After the 1760s, the relationship between Baptists and Anglicans were incredibly tensed 
(Pyle et al, 2003:61).  But the Baptists and Presbyterians never managed to successfully 
challenge the power of the Anglicans, thus the Anglicans remained in full control of 
Virginia and were able to use their political power to thwart any effort by the Baptists and 
Presbyterians to obtain power (Pyle et al, 2003:61).  A similar scenario could be found in 
Pennsylvania where the politically powerful Quakers were challenged by the Anglican 
minority present within this colony (Pyle et al, 2003:62). 
 
In the cases of Virginia and Pennsylvania the dominant faiths of the colonies benefited 
from superior economic and political resources in order to prevent their competitors from 
making advances in the social hierarchy and at the same time establish their own 
superiority as a social group. 
 
3.5 Reactionary Violence 
The fourth option for dealing with invidious comparisons is reactionary violence.  This 
option is pursued within the belief system of social change.  A group that constantly finds 
themselves at the losing end when comparisons are being made will often make use of 
violence to fight their position of inferiority.  This type of violence is reactionary and 
usually a last resort for dealing with invidious comparisons.  According to Horowitz 
(2000:166) evidence shows that “backward groups are more frequent initiators” of 
violence while advanced groups are more frequently the intended targets of this violence.  
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The concepts of backward and advanced groups were first introduced by Horowitz.  He 
explains that to be a backward group the group needs to feel weak in relation to advanced 
groups.  Comparisons with other groups are not a viable option for the group‟s inferior 
position is imminent and further comparison would just reinforce their feeling of 
backwardness and their position of inferiority.  Horowitz (2000:167) explains: 
“Backward groups in general feel at a competitive disadvantage as they compare their 
imputed personal qualities with those imputed to advanced groups.”   
 
Belonging to an inferior group results in a lack of self-esteem for group members.  
According to Horowitz (2000:179) “a correlation has been found between lack of 
individual self-esteem and degree of hostility toward out-groups [and] aggression… 
[becomes] a means by which to gain a sense of worth.”  To the backward group survival 
is of key concern.  This fear of extinction also provides a ready “rationale for hostility” 
(Horowitz, 2000:175, 180). 
 
In 1998 Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Secretary of State, listed thirty of the world‟s most 
dangerous groups.  Over half of these groups were religious (Juergunsmeyer, 2001:6).  
This list illustrated that religious groups – predominantly fundamentalist – increasingly 
used violence to „communicate‟ with the secular world.  Reactionary violence based on 
religious convictions has become a great threat to modern society and a deeper analysis 
of this phenomenon is necessary at this stage. 
 
Authors such as Horowitz (2000), Fisher (1999) and Castells (2004) are in agreement that 
religious fundamentalists are reactionary by nature.  Mostly they are reactive against 
“aspects of modern life” (Fisher, 1999:21).  According to Horowitz (2000:166) “the sense 
of backwardness is a profoundly unsettling group feeling.”  It is a feeling that has the 
tendency to inspire reactionary violence which “clearly reflect[s] felt differences in 
acculturation to modern ways” (Horowitz, 2000:168).  Kimball (2008:200) is of opinion 
that “fear, insecurity, and the desire to protect” often inspires or enables a group to 
dehumanise the out-group and even to wage war against the out-group.  Juergunsmeyer, 
as quoted from McTernan (2003:35), argues that “these movements are not simply 
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aberrations but religious responses to social situations and expressions of deeply held 
convictions.” 
 
It has been mentioned in a previous section that fundamentalists aim to protect their 
religious identity from modernity.  It is exactly when the fundamentalists fail to 
successfully achieve this that they turn to violence to find a solution.  Fox and Shmuel 
(2004:85) argue that “fundamentalist militancy begins as a reaction to the penetration of 
their community by secular or religious outsiders.”  Fundamentalists are of opinion that 
modernisation “has undermined traditional lifestyles, community values, and morals, 
which are based in part on religion” (Fox & Shmuel, 2004:112).  Religious 
fundamentalists question the legitimacy of the secular world.  A common complaint is 
that the secular world has excluded God and, as a result, has become valueless.  
Therefore, the goal of religious fundamentalists “is to make religion the foundation of a 
new social order” based on the belief that “society should conform to the commands and 
values of their sacred foundational texts” (McTernan, 2003:27).   
 
Horowitz (2000:181) is of the opinion that “people often express hostility toward those 
who create uncertainty about the correctness of their own behavior and that of the groups 
to which they belong.”  A violent reaction to secular modernity is usually bred by 
feelings of humiliation due to being viewed by „the other‟ as inferior.  According to Stern 
(2003:282) a way to rid oneself of this inferior identity is to assume the role of martyr 
“on behalf of a purported spiritual cause.”  The tables are turned and suddenly the weak 
becomes the strong, the one previously considered to be inferior now has destructive 
powers over the secular world (Stern, 2003:282).  In this case aggression becomes ego-
syntonic for the group or individual.  It becomes “a means by which to gain a sense of 
worth” (Horowitz, 2000:179). 
 
According to Austin and Worchel (1979) violence “often represents the only channel 
available for [some group] to express itself, to be heard, and to obtain recognition and 
visibility.”  Therefore, Juergunsmeyer, as quoted from McTernan (2003:35), is of the 
opinion that “religion provides [the religious fundamentalist] with a sense of honour, 
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personal pride, kinship and identity. Violence gives them a sense of empowerment. The 
combination of religion and violence provides the antidotes to humiliation.”  By 
empowering themselves through the use of violence, religious fundamentalists can rid 
themselves of the humiliation of constantly being viewed as a backward group.  
 
The resort to violence is often viewed by the fundamentalists as the only way to 
effectively communicate their message to the secular world and establish their presence 
as a force to be reckoned with.  Through this they also ensure the continued survival of 
their group because “a group that cannot compete will be overcome or will die out” 
(Horowitz, 2000:178).  Most importantly, they are not interested to negotiate with their 
enemy, the secular world – otherwise considered by them as the evil forces.  The 
fundamentalist view corresponds very much to the words of Windass (1964:102): “You 
cannot negotiate with a total enemy, any more than you can make a truce with the devil. 
Only destruction and defeat make sense.”  Their view is based on a demand for 
unconditional surrender and a complete rejection of a negotiated peace (Windass, 
1964:101).  According to McTernan (2003:42) “the unwillingness to compromise stems 
from the belief that they have a total and exclusive monopoly on truth and goodness.” 
 
The conflict between religious fundamentalists and the secular state is framed in terms of 
good versus evil, between truth and falsehood, and between the children of God and 
offspring of Satan (Selengut, 2003:18).  This is a characteristic of a Holy war.  Believers 
do not choose between violence and nonviolence “but are drafted into God‟s infantry to 
fight the Lord‟s battles and proclaim his message to the world” (Selengut, 2003:18).  
Although this may sound irrational to the secular mind, to believers Holy wars are “acts 
of faith which are eminently reasonable and rest on a coherent principled theological 
rationale” (Selengut, 2003:19).  Holy wars only have religious goals and are waged to 
bring about “an improved human order” (Selengut, 2003:19).  Stern (2003:281) came to 
the conclusion that most religious fundamentalist groups who engage in violent acts to 
cleanse the world of evil believe, or at least started out believing, “that they are creating a 
more perfect world. From their perspective, they are purifying the world of injustice, 
cruelty, and all that is antihuman.”  Within Holy wars the Golden Rule of „love thy 
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neighbor as thyself‟ or the commandment „thou shalt not murder‟ is not applicable for 
Holy wars are not about murder but rather about “situational moments of divine – human 
cooperation in furtherance of God‟s plan for justice and human redemption”(Selengut, 
2003:21). 
 
There are two reasons why Christian fundamentalists will engage in acts related to Holy 
war.  The first reason is to protect or defend their religion against the enemy.  The enemy 
is seen as anyone who threatens their spiritual well-being.  By tolerating cultural 
expressions like pornography, the sale of alcohol, and also other practices that are seen as 
a danger to Christian moral values, the secular government has been identified as the 
main enemy of the Christian fundamentalist.  The second reason to engage in acts related 
to Holy war is to punish deviance.  Those who challenge religious orthodoxy should be 
punished.  This explains the attacks on abortion clinics and doctors who are willing to 
perform abortions.  According to the Christian fundamentalist these individuals need to 
be taught a lesson (Selengut, 2003:22). 
 
Gray (2008:204) argues that “revolutionaries have time and again come to accept 
violence as an instrument for cleansing the world of evil.”  It is probably due to a similar 
conclusion drawn by Herbert Lockyear that he claimed there could be no world peace 
because “the Bible contradicts such a utopian dream” (Armstrong, 2004:217). 
 
According to Selengut (2003:224) “the bulk of cases involving religious violence are 
motivated by religious doctrine, faith, and sacred fury.”  McTernan (2003:22) explains 
that religiously motivated acts of violence are based on a religious belief that the 
“scriptural or foundational texts were dictated verbatim by a divine authority and as such 
are beyond interpretation.  The word as it is written must be obeyed.”  Religious 
fundamentalists are convinced that their scriptures and traditions are the absolute and 
single truth, and those who oppose their beliefs or way of life are at fault.  This is made 
problematic when one includes the fact that those fundamentalists consider themselves to 
be willing soldiers for God, they are forced to fight those who are “violating God‟s 
directives to humanity” (Selengut, 2003:2).  In essence religious fundamentalists act on 
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“deeply held religious convictions” and a belief that they are carrying out some sacred 
duty to give glory to God (McTernan, 2003:22).  According to Juergunsmeyer (2001:218) 
religious justifications for violence have enabled religious activists “to go about their 
business of killing with the certainty that they were following the logic of God.” 
 
3.5.1 Christian Fundamentalism in the United States 
Although considered one of the most developed countries of the First World the United 
States has not been exempted from “violent episodes associated with American religious 
extremists” such as the Christian Identity movement, the Christian militia, and Christian 
anti-abortion activists (Juergunsmeyer, 2001:3-4).  Increasingly the U.S. has been forced 
to confront religious violence stemming from their own citizens and aimed at their 
national government and its secular policies (Juergunsmeyer, 2001:4).  In the last few 
decades the U.S. was confronted by the bombings of abortion clinics, gay bars, and 
federal buildings and also with the brutal killings of doctors and staff who were willing to 
perform abortions (Juergunsmeyer, 2001:23,31).  Selengut (2003:167) argues that 
“violence has been a part of the Christian traditionalist response to secular modernity.”  
In the following paragraphs it will be illustrated in which way violence has formed part 
of the Christian fundamentalist‟s response to secular modernity. 
 
Traditional Christian groups in the U.S. are in many ways familiar and quite at home with 
modernity.  Selengut (2003:167) explains: “The rational and bureaucratic organization of 
the workplace, the intricacies of secular politics and international affairs, and the limited 
role of religion in the public sphere are familiar and understandable to these faithful 
Christians.”  Yet they remain hostile to secular modernity.  The mere fact that these 
Christians are confronted with modernity and the workings of a secular government has 
angered them greatly.  First of all they are angry that the Bible is not respected as the 
word of God but rather treated as literature; second, because their Christian morals have 
been largely rejected in favour of modernism; and third, because homosexuals are 
accepted and that evolution is taught in schools.  There has been an overall disregard of 
their teachings within the secular world and this has angered them to a point where some 
individuals have shown their disgust through acts of religious violence.  They are fighting 
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back by attempting to “[turn] society back to God and Christian morality and values” 
(Selengut, 2003:166).  
 
Within the U.S. there is a host of religious extremist groups who believe “that only the 
destruction of the modern democratic state and its culture will liberate Christian America 
from the Satanic powers of the degenerate morality and values of modern Western 
Civilization” (Selengut, 2003:167).  The Aryan Nation movement, the White Patriots 
Party, the White American Bastion, and the Silent Brotherhood are all connected to the 
Christian Identity movement.  These groups actively pursue violence as a fitting response 
to secular modernity (Selengut, 2003:167). 
 
The Christian opponents to abortion have been a very active force within the U.S. over 
the last few decades.  The bombings of abortion clinics and the murders of abortion 
providers have been well documented.  These acts are considered to be “a religious 
obligation for faithful Christians” (Selengut, 2003:36).  These Christian fundamentalists 
are urged “to do all they can to destroy secular American society and set up the Bible as 
the law of the land” (Selengut, 2003:36).   
 
Mike Bray, convicted for the bombings of abortion clinics, claimed that he was motivated 
to bring down the secular government as “he saw American society in a state of utter 
depravity, over which its elected officials presided with an almost satanic disregard for 
truth and human life” (Juergunsmeyer, 2001:23).  Bray also stated that “Christianity gives 
him the right to defend innocent unborn children even by use of force” (Juergunsmeyer, 
2001:23).  Bray provides a fitting example of the mind of a Christian fundamentalist.  
First he identified his secular government as an evil force – relating its behaviour to that 
of Satan - and then he reacted with violence against the secular „other‟ and justified his 
actions in the name of Christianity. 
 
As a last thought on the issue it should be mentioned that many of these Christian 
fundamentalists are also postmillenialists. They believe “that a Christian Kingdom must 
be established on earth before Christ‟s return” (Juergunsmeyer, 2001:28).  This belief 
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almost necessitates violence in order to establish the Bible as the law of the land and 
these instances of violence will not stop until the Christian Kingdom has been 
established.  A study conducted by the Institute for the Study of American Religion 
(ISAR) and Center for Studies on New Religion (CESNUR) concluded, fitting to the 
previous point made, that “even though incidents of violence may be rare… future 
episodes will continue to occur” (McTernan, 2003:40). 
 
3.6 Complete Withdrawal: A Possible Fifth Option 
In sections 3.2 to 3.5 the options for dealing with invidious comparisons as outlined by 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) were discussed.  It was established that individual mobility 
involved the dissociation of the individual from the in-group where the in-group failed to 
provide a positive sense of self.  The example of religious affiliation in the United States 
was provided to illustrate this strategy.  The second option, social creativity, is best 
described as a strategy where the elements of the comparative situation are altered.  This 
includes the creation of a new dimension of comparison where the example of the 
relationship between Protestants and Catholics were discussed within the setting of the 
Thirty Years‟ War and the impact of the Peace of Westphalia.  Second, social creativity 
includes the sub-option to change the rankings.  Here the in-group can reverse the 
established value system to convert previous negative connotations into positive ones.  
Third, social creativity includes the sub-option to change the out-group.  The examples of 
religious fundamentalists and secularism in the U.S., as well as the creation of a global 
collective consciousness, were provided.  The third option discussed for dealing with 
invidious comparisons was social competition.  This option involves direct competition 
with the out-group in order to attain higher status.  The example of Colonial America was 
used to discuss competition between Christian denominations for the establishment of a 
bishop and also for political power.  The fourth and last option discussed was the option 
of reactionary violence.  Here the role of backward groups was discussed in the initiation 
of violence against the out-group as a last resort to attain higher status in the social 
hierarchy.  Many religious fundamentalist groups have made use of this option to 
establish themselves within the social hierarchy.   
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The four options discussed in this chapter and again outlined in the above paragraph, 
have been presented as the only options to deal with invidious comparisons.  But after 
careful reconsideration and taking into account the religious groups encountered during 
research, it was noted that these options failed to explain the behaviour of one particular 
religious group, the Amish.  A brief description of this religious group and their views are 
necessary at this stage. 
 
According to Hood et al. (2005:134) “the Amish believe that theirs is a unique and 
redemptive community called to be separate from the world.”  The Amish, as a religious 
social group, refrains from “propagating the gospel by insisting that others conform to 
their beliefs or practices” (Hood et al, 2005:134).  They are aware of their “differences 
from dominant culture” but these differences are understood by the Amish “to be 
indicators of a far deeper and more meaningful religious structure” (Hood et al, 
2005:134).  This religious group rather finds salvation in complete withdrawal from 
larger society.  They withdraw not as individuals, but as an entire social group.   
 
In terms of the options to deal with invidious comparisons as provided in sections 3.2 to 
3.5, it becomes clear that the behaviour of the Amish does not quite fit into this 
framework.  Firstly, the strategy of individual mobility can be eliminated because the 
Amish withdraw from society as an entire social group.  Thus, their withdrawal is a group 
strategy.  The option of social creativity with its subsections also does not explain the 
behaviour of the Amish.  As already mentioned, the option of social creativity involves 
“altering the elements of the comparative situation” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:43).  The 
Amish do not compare themselves with any other social group.  They have completely 
separated themselves from mainstream society and lead their lives in seclusion.  The fact 
that the Amish do not compare themselves with other social groups also implies that they 
do not compete with other social groups.  Thus, the option of social competition also does 
not describe their behaviour.  Finally, the fourth option, violence as a reaction, also does 
not describe the behaviour of the Amish.  This group has never reacted violently to the 
secular world or any other social group within this world.  The Amish have not even 
reacted in a non-violent way to any other social group.  They are “nonconfrontational 
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[pacifists…] their purpose and their meaning… is not to transform culture, but rather to 
withdraw from it” (Hood et al, 2005:153).  The only request they make to dominant 
society is to be “allowed to continue their ways without interference” (Hood et al, 
2005:153). 
 
It becomes clear that none of the options discussed fit the option chosen by the Amish to 
deal with invidious comparisons.  Their behaviour should be explained by an option that 
involves the withdrawal of an entire social group in order to completely separate 
themselves from mainstream society.  Although examples for such an option are quite 
rare outside the Amish case, it is still existent and should be accounted for.  Therefore it 
is proposed that a fifth option be added, the option of complete withdrawal as a group 
strategy.  This option would specifically involve the complete withdrawal from 
mainstream society by an entire social group who has no interest in interacting with other 
social groups.  Meaning, this social group would refrain from comparing themselves to or 
competing with other social groups.  This social group would also refrain from reacting 
to other social groups in a violent way.  Like the Amish, a social group that makes use of 
this proposed option should successfully form their own world separate from the world in 
which other social groups are forced to function. 
 
In the following chapter the options for dealing with invidious comparisons will be 
evaluated according to the viability of each option, specifically with regards to religious 
fundamentalist groups.  Religious fundamentalists are forced to function in a secular 
world which considers them to be backward and inferior.  Therefore the concluding 
chapter will investigate, according to the religious fundamentalist, which option would be 
best to pursue in order to establish their in-group as a superior group, a group ranked high 
on the social hierarchy.  In other words, which option would ensure the survival, or even 
the blossoming, of the religious fundamentalist in-group?  This topic will be discussed in 
an attempt to shed some light on, what some academics have called, „a hard-to-
understand phenomenon,‟ the phenomenon of violent religious fundamentalism. 
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Chapter 4 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
4.1 Social Identity and Religion 
In the introduction of this study it was mentioned that we often encounter others “whose 
identity and nature are not clear to us” (Jenkins, 1996:9).  Religious fundamentalists have 
certainly, up to this time, fallen within this category.  Berger (1999:2) is probably not 
alone in his understanding of religious fundamentalism when he proclaims it to be a 
“strange, hard-to-understand phenomena.” 
 
This study started by introducing the intratextual model, as developed by Hood et al. 
(2005), to explain the all important role of religious texts within religious fundamentalist 
movements.  First of all, in order to truly comprehend this model and its imminent impact 
on fundamentalist behaviour and thought, we need to accept, even if just for this 
particular moment, that the religious fundamentalists are correct to believe that their 
sacred text contain the single and ultimate truth.  Of course, we also need to take into 
account that this model is applicable to all religious fundamentalist groups and therefore 
the Bible, Quran, Torah, and a number of other sacred texts, all have the exact same 
impact on their specific fundamentalist followers.   
 
Hood et al. (2005:22-23) explained that “a dialogic encounter emerges between the 
reader and the text in which the revelation of the Divine Being becomes illuminated in 
the form of absolute truths.”  Of course, to the outsider it is clear that there exists a 
multitude of sacred texts and therefore there exists a multitude of absolute truths.  
However, to the religious fundamentalist there is no question that only his truth, provided 
by his sacred text, is the only truth, the single truth.  According to Herriot (2007:55) “the 
inerrancy of scripture is one of the basic and non-negotiable beliefs which are the 
foundation of fundamentalist doctrine.”  Those who do not recognise this sacred text as 
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the single source of authority are considered a threat to the fundamentalist worldview and 
are treated as outsiders or even as outright enemies.  It is these sacred texts, treated as 
absolute truths, that provide a platform for intolerance of the „other‟ and his/her views 
and beliefs.  Based on this intratextual model it becomes quite clear why Tetreault and 
Denemark (2004:273) argue that “religious social movements create powerful in-group 
solidarity and vicious out-group characterization.” 
 
Social identity theory has been thoroughly explained in the second chapter and therefore 
it will not be repeated here.  However, it is necessary to highlight a few key aspects of the 
theory before continuing.  It is important to remember that social groups do not stand in 
isolation.  They are formed in contrast to other social groups.  Thus, the existence of one 
social group implies the existence of a contrasting group.  Group members strive to attain 
a positive sense of self.  Because the individual group member is such an integrated part 
of the group the individual‟s self-concept will be based on the evaluation of the group as 
a whole.  The evaluation of the group is determined through comparisons with other 
groups.  Positive outcomes of group comparisons will result in high status for the group 
and enhanced self-esteem for its members while a negative outcome will result in low 
status for the group and low self-esteem for the group members (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979:40). 
 
With the social identity in mind, it was necessary to give attention to an important 
question posed by Kimball (2008:100): How can each social group function best “in a 
world in which most others don‟t share the same understanding?”  The third chapter 
addressed this issue by outlining the options for dealing with invidious comparisons.  
Examples for these options were exclusively drawn from Christian experiences both in 
the past and present.  Since this thesis ultimately wants to effectively address the hard-to-
understand phenomenon that is religious fundamentalism, these options will now be 
evaluated according to their viability for religious fundamentalists and their striving for 
survival.  According to Armstrong (2004:362) “fundamentalism is not going to 
disappear.”  Therefore it is of the utmost importance that this „hard-to-explain 
phenomenon‟ is clarified in an almost simplistic fashion that rests on the basis of social 
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identity theory.  This will allow for the comprehension of religious fundamentalists as 
social groupings and will explain their behaviour accordingly.  So the question now 
becomes: How can religious fundamentalist groups function best in a world where most 
other social groups do not share the same understanding?  Before this question is 
addressed it is necessary to remind the reader of some of the main features of religious 
fundamentalism. 
 
In the second chapter the main features of religious fundamentalists, as provided by 
Herriot (2007), were outlined.  First, fundamentalist movements form in reaction to 
modernism; second, they view the world in binary terms, either good or evil, for or 
against them; third, they respect their sacred text as the only authoritative text and blindly 
obey it; fourth, they read their sacred text selectively to establish which parts take 
precedence over others; and fifth, they believe in the end God will establish his kingdom 
on earth.  It was also established in the second chapter that religious fundamentalists are 
more intolerant than their non-fundamentalist counterparts.  Apart from verbally rejecting 
the „other‟, religious fundamentalist groups are more likely to segregate themselves from 
other social groups as is the case with the Amish, and are also more likely to participate 
in the highest degree of intolerance, namely physical attack.  Numerous abortion clinic 
bombings in the United States, the Oklahoma City bombing 1995, and the attack on the 
World Trade Center in 2001 come to mind. 
 
Although the focus of this study fell exclusively on Christianity and Christian 
fundamentalism it is possible to make certain generalisations that apply to all religious 
fundamentalist groups within the monotheistic framework.  All of these fundamentalists – 
Christian, Jewish, or Muslim – believe to be in possession of the single truth.  Therefore, 
as Hood et al. (2008) argued when explaining the intratextual model, it is not an issue 
revolving so much around the content of fundamentalist beliefs but rather an issue of how 
they believe.  It is here that the common denominator is to be found.  All of them believe 
in a single absolute truth and all of them believe to be correct.  Of course the main 
features of religious fundamentalists, as discussed in the previous paragraph, also apply 
to all monotheistic fundamentalist groups.  Therefore, when discussing the options for 
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dealing with invidious comparisons and its viability for religious fundamentalist groups, a 
generalisation could be made to include all religious fundamentalist groups within the 
monotheistic framework and not just Christian fundamentalism (the focus of the study so 
far).  All these religious fundamentalist groups are pursuing the same ends only within a 
different belief structure. 
 
4.2 Evaluating the Options 
The inerrancy of their holy scripture is of the utmost importance to the religious 
fundamentalist and their beliefs and actions are based on the contents of their scripture.  
To deviate from it is to betray your God and also your fellow group members.  Religious 
fundamentalism literally requires conformity of biblical proportions.  It is also important 
to remind the reader that religious fundamentalists are viewed as backwards by many 
social groups.  Yet these fundamentalists are forced to function in a predominantly 
secular world.  It is for these reasons that only a few of the options discussed in the third 
chapter present viable alternatives for religious fundamentalist groups to pursue. 
 
4.2.1 Individual Mobility 
The case made for individual mobility becomes problematic when applied to religious 
fundamentalists.  These fundamentalists simply know that they are right “because they 
have read the truth in a holy book and they know, in advance, that nothing will budge 
them from their belief” (Dawkins, 2006:319).  According to Dawkins (2006:319) the holy 
book is “an axiom and not a process of reasoning.”  But then again, religious 
fundamentalists are not renowned for their reasoning skills.  The truth of their holy book 
is not likely to be brought into questioning and any evidence that contradicts it will 
mostly likely result in the evidence being discarded, not the holy book (Dawkins, 
2006:319). 
 
Harris (2008:150) admits that “it is no straightforward task to engage such people 
[fundamentalists] in constructive dialogue, to convince them of our common interests… 
and to mutually celebrate the diversity of our cultures.”  If we want to establish peaceful 
means and ends, society and religious individuals, especially religious fundamentalists, 
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“must undergo a radical transformation” (Harris, 2006:151).  It should be so radical, it 
will require religious fundamentalists to let go of the most important and most defining 
aspect of their being.   
 
It is possible for some fundamentalists to “experience a conversion into a different 
worldview” (Herriot, 2007:120).  Through secular science it is possible to create 
uncertainties in moderate religious circles but less likely so within the religious 
fundamentalist camp.  The reason for this is that religious fundamentalists can simply 
disregard any argument that may bring about uncertainties within their belief system as 
they can explain it away by simply referring to one or more of their basic assumptions – 
such as the inerrancy of the Bible (Herriot, 2007:120).  It can also be argued that for 
some reason the advances made in secular science, arguments formed that have the 
ability to evoke uncertainty about religious fundamentalist beliefs, have only 
strengthened the belief of religious fundamentalists.  For the reasons provided, it can be 
argued that individual mobility is not a strategy likely to be pursued by religious 
fundamentalists. 
 
4.2.2 Social Creativity 
Under the second option, namely social creativity, three sub-options were discussed.  
These were (a) creating a new dimension of comparison, (b) changing the rankings, and 
(c) changing the out-group.  These three sub-options will be evaluated in this section. 
 
4.2.2.1 New Dimension of Comparison 
As has already been mentioned, examples of any social group, much less religious social 
groups, which have pursued this strategy in the past to improve their status are hard to 
find.  The main problem encountered with this strategy is the act of legitimising the new 
dimension of comparison, not only in the eyes of the in-group, but specifically for the 
out-group.  If there is any chance that the new dimension of comparison will threaten the 
superior status of the out-group, the out-group will simply not agree to the new 
dimension of comparison, they will reject it.  The religious fundamentalists face the very 
same problem.  They can try to change the most salient dimension of comparison in order 
Religion, Intolerance, and Social Identity 
89 
 
to improve their comparative status but their new dimension of comparison is likely to be 
rejected by those groups that rank higher on the social hierarchy.  Therefore, it is argued 
that changing the dimension of comparison is not a viable strategy to pursue in order to 
improve the ranking and status of religious fundamentalist groups. 
 
4.2.2.2 Changing the Rankings 
Two strategies were initially discussed under this heading.  One, the religious social 
group can modernise in order to improve their status as promoted by Armstrong (2006) 
and Kimball (2008), or two, the group can change the negative connotation previously 
made to a salient aspect of their identity into a positive connotation.  The example of 
„Black is Beautiful‟ was mentioned by Tajfel and Turner (1979) in the context of the civil 
rights movement in 1960s America. 
 
In the religious fundamentalist case modernisation is simply out of the question.  Within 
the more moderate ranks of the religious realm this strategy may be completely viable 
but, in the fundamentalist case, it is important to take into account the fact that the 
fundamentalist identity is firmly rooted in a deliberate failure to modernise.  It was, and 
is, specifically widespread modernisation that has caused these groups to grab hold of the 
fundamentals of their religion in order to protect and preserve it, to guard it against the 
influences of secularism.  To modernise would, in effect, mean to cease to be a 
fundamentalist, to completely let go of an enormous part of the social identity.  Thus, 
modernisation is not a viable avenue for religious fundamentalist groups to pursue. 
 
In terms of changing the rankings, Elizondo (1985) provides the answer for religious 
fundamentalists.  He provides a number of ways for the religious fundamentalist to give 
aspects with previously negative connotation positive characteristics.  First, Elizondo 
(1985:47) introduces the Gospel Matrix which proclaims that in the end all people “must 
be judged by the words of the gospels.”  This already provides the fundamentalist with 
the upper-hand as the inerrancy of the scripture is of key importance and is accepted as 
the absolute truth and the ultimate authoritative text (refer back to the intratextual model 
in section 1.3).  According to the fundamentalists, the Gospel Matrix places them in a 
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superior position to those individuals and social groups that do not strictly adhere to their 
holy scripture.  Second, Elizondo (1985:53) argues: “What the world rejects, God 
chooses as his very own.”  Again, this statement places the religious fundamentalist in a 
superior position, for they are the rejected of this world, they are the ones considered to 
be backwards by many other social groups – specifically the secular world.  But now the 
religious fundamentalist is told that God invites “especially those who have been 
rejected” into his kingdom.  According to Elizondo‟s measurements, religious 
fundamentalists are now starting to move up the social hierarchy with some pace.  And 
now Elizondo (1985) deals the final blow.  According to God “the simple people will be 
the first ones to understand the love and wisdom of the father; the wise and intelligent of 
„this world‟ will be excluded” (Elizondo, 1985:56).  Religious fundamentalists 
understand the greatness of God while the secular world, based on science and liberal 
values, lacks this understanding.  Therefore, in terms of eternal rewards, the religious 
fundamentalist is sure to gain access to heaven while those who fail to understand the 
love and wisdom of God will be excluded and instead be condemned to burn in hell for 
all eternity. 
 
Through Elizondo‟s (1985) arguments the religious fundamentalists are able to turn the 
existing social hierarchy on its head.  They can now live and measure themselves 
according to God‟s social hierarchy, where they assume top position, while rejecting the 
social hierarchy based on earthly, secular standards.  Through this argumentation the 
religious fundamentalists are able to reject any negative connotations and turn it into 
positive characteristics.  This proves to be a viable option to pursue in order to improve 
group ranking and self-esteem.  However, one obvious problem should be addressed.  
Although the religious fundamentalists now live according to the hierarchy of God and 
claim to be superior, other social groups still live according to the earthly social hierarchy 
mainly based on secular standards and still consider the fundamentalists to be inferior.  
The religious fundamentalists have only improved their social standing in the hierarchy 
of God but have still failed to improve their standing in the secular world.  Still, this 
strategy succeeds in improving self-esteem and should be considered successful if only 
for this reason. 
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4.2.2.3 Changing the Out-Group 
The creation of a global collective consciousness, as promoted by Armstrong (2006), has 
been discussed in a previous section as a strategy to change the out-group, but due to this 
strategy‟s absolute inclusive nature it will be immediately disregarded as a strategy likely 
to be pursued by religious fundamentalist groups. 
 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that in some cases where the in-group compares 
unfavourably with the out-group of comparison, the in-group can change their out-group 
to a lower status group which will allow for favourable comparisons.  Religious 
fundamentalists have positioned themselves firmly as an alternative to the secular world 
and therefore compare themselves on various levels with the secular world.  One reason 
to question the viability of this option with regards to religious fundamentalists  is that 
choosing the dominant secular world as the primary out-group may be slightly too 
ambitious for a group that is considered to be backwards.  Religious fundamentalists are 
probably better off to change their out-group to a different religious fundamentalist 
group, or even moderate religious groups, in order to establish a sense of superiority.  But 
of course, such an observation belongs solely to a non-fundamentalist outsider. 
 
As it has been argued in section 3.3.3.1, the religious fundamentalists do not consider 
themselves to be inferior to the secular world or any other social group and thus, 
choosing the secular world as the primary out-group is not an option that is „too 
ambitious‟.  According to religious fundamentalists they are superior because they are 
favoured by God.  They are able to retain a unique sense of superiority while comparing 
themselves to „so-called‟ higher status groups.  Thus, it does not matter who the out-
group is and a change in out-group certainly will not affect the position of the religious 
fundamentalist group on the social hierarchy.  But again, as is the case with changing the 
rankings, with this type of reasoning the religious fundamentalists have only improved 
their sense of self but have failed to improve the overall standing of their group on the 
social hierarchy based on secular standards.  Thus, this strategy is not likely to be pursued 
in order to improve the social ranking of the entire group. 
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4.2.3 Social Competition 
It could be argued that religious fundamentalists compete with the secular world to 
establish their values and beliefs as the dominant values and beliefs.  But religious 
fundamentalists are, in essence, considered to be „backwards‟.  In contrast, the secular 
world is an „advanced‟ social group.  Competition between these two groups is likely to 
confirm the superiority of the secular world and the backwardness of the religious 
fundamentalists.  In section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 it was illustrated how dominant social groups, 
in these cases Congregationalists in Massachusetts and Anglicans in Virginia, used their 
position of dominance in the social hierarchy to suppress other social groups who 
challenged their dominant position.  In both cases success was guaranteed due to the 
dominant group‟s control of resources which could be effectively employed to head off 
the advances made by the out-group.  Today the secular world is able to effectively use 
their control of resources to head off the advances made by other social groups who 
present an alternative to the current secular model.   
 
However, Christian fundamentalists in the U.S. have not been fazed by their social 
standing in comparison to the secular world and actively engage in social competition 
with their secular government.  Quite surprisingly, in some respects the Christian 
fundamentalists have been successful.  By establishing radio stations and television 
networks, Christian fundamentalists in the U.S. have successfully made use of the media 
as a medium to promote their alternative to the secular world.  They have also established 
alternative institutions such as independent churches and schools.  Thus, it is possible for 
the religious fundamentalists to compete with the secular world in terms of spreading 
their message and reaching large numbers of possible followers.  Social competition of 
this kind will at least ensure the survival of religious fundamentalist groups.  However, 
with predominant liberal values widely accepted, the fundamentalists will struggle to 
establish their beliefs and traditions as the dominant beliefs and traditions.  In other 
words, religious fundamentalists are not likely to successfully achieve their ends through 
the use of social competition as an option to deal with invidious comparisons. 
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4.2.4 Reactionary Violence 
According to Juergunsmeyer (2001:10) religion often leads to violence within a peculiar 
set of circumstances, usually in times when religion becomes “fused with violent 
expressions of social aspirations, personal pride, and movements for change.”  One 
should never forget that religious fundamentalists are considered to be backwards by 
other social groups and, therefore, religious fundamentalists occupy the lower ranks of 
the social hierarchy.  Of course, like any other social group, they strive to improve their 
position as a group on this hierarchy.  A successful attempt will lead to higher status and, 
as a result, enhanced self-esteem for group members.  But religious fundamentalists find 
themselves in a peculiar position.  Although they are viewed as backwards they are 
reluctant to modernise in order to enhance their status and improve their social standing 
as a group.  Thus, religious fundamentalists find themselves in the lower rankings of the 
social hierarchy – being considered backwards by most other social groups - while being 
unwilling to change their ways.  Yet, they still strive to become superior to other social 
groups. 
 
According to social identity theory an actual or perceived threat to the group and its 
members can inspire aggression and sometimes violent conflict.  Castells (2004:24) is of 
opinion that religious fundamentalists “long for the security of traditional values and 
institutions rooted in God‟s eternal truth.”  However, these traditional values have 
consistently, and in most parts successfully, been challenged by the secular world.  
Science and liberal values have slowly but surely replaced these traditional values as the 
dominant values of society.  This has led religious fundamentalists “to perceive 
themselves a minority under threat of destruction by secular society” (Herriot, 2007:36).  
They are, in essence, struggling for survival in the secular world and their options to do 
so seem to be limited.  But there is another feature that should be taken into account, for 
the ends of the fundamentalists are much more ambitious than simply ensuring survival. 
 
Religious fundamentalists want to establish their traditional values and religious beliefs 
as the dominant values and beliefs.  In their minds, there are no doubts that they adhere to 
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the one authentic faith and that their beliefs and way of living should be adopted by 
everyone else.  Religious fundamentalists are actively pursuing their utopia.  Coupled 
with the belief that their actions are executed, and therefore justified, in the name of God 
their means to achieve the ends are often violent.  According to Herriot (2007:16) this 
specific kind of religious fundamentalist believes that “God‟s rules permit, nay require, 
violent assault on the secular world.”  This type of violent assault on the secular world 
often comes as a surprise to the targets as it is usually a one-sided attack on an enemy that 
did not agree to conflict.   
 
But, yet again, there is a feature that should be accounted for.  According to social 
identity theory a successful attack on the enemy brings a sense of victory and power and 
also enhances group identification and self-esteem (Herriot, 2007:15).  By surprising 
their enemy with a calculated attack the religious fundamentalist is certain of a victory 
and the feeling of superiority that comes with it.  A victorious social group gains status, 
its group members gain enhanced self-esteem and both gain superiority in relation to the 
out-group(s).  Reactionary violence as an option to deal with invidious comparisons thus 
becomes an effective way of establishing the relevance of the social group, improving 
social status, and enhancing the self-esteem of group members. 
 
4.2.5 Complete Withdrawal 
A possible fifth option was discussed in section 3.6.  This option, based on the Amish 
example, promotes complete withdrawal from the secular world to establish a separate 
community who do not compare or compete with any other social group.  A group who 
pursues this strategy will live in complete seclusion without interference from the secular 
world and without interfering in the secular world.  The Amish, a religious 
fundamentalist group, has shown that this option can be pursued successfully.  However, 
if the fundamentalist group wants to establish God‟s kingdom on earth this option will 
not be preferred.  The same is true for religious fundamentalist groups who want to 
establish their relevancy as a social group in the social hierarchy.  This option will only 
be preferred by fundamentalist groups who are content with accentuating their own 
superiority by means of segregation and not by the conventional means of comparing and 
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competing with other social groups.  Thus, complete withdrawal can be a viable option 
for some religious fundamentalist groups, but definitely not for others. 
 
4.3 The Expected Future 
In the previous sections options for dealing with invidious comparisons were evaluated 
according to their viability for religious fundamentalist social groups.  It should be 
mentioned again that although the main focus of this study fell on Christianity and 
Christian fundamentalism, the conclusions drawn can be generalised to include the wider 
religious fundamentalist community within the monotheistic framework.   
 
It is now necessary to return to two very important questions mentioned earlier.  One, 
how can religious fundamentalist groups function best in a world where most other social 
groups do not share the same understanding?  And two, can violent attacks be avoided in 
the process?  Although there are a host of options available to these groups it was 
established that the means and ends of different fundamentalist groups will play a very 
important role in deciding which option(s) they are likely to pursue.   
 
For those religious fundamentalist groups who are content with a low ranking on a social 
hierarchy based on secular standards, there are a host of options to consider in order to 
effectively deal with invidious comparisons.  These fundamentalist groups can become 
socially creative by either changing the rankings or changing the out-group.  They can 
also consider engaging in social competition to win the hearts and minds of possible 
followers.  Complete withdrawal is another option that should be considered by these 
specific fundamentalist groups.  Although these options are unlikely to replace secular 
values and norms with religious values and norms, religious fundamentalists will at least 
be able to ensure survival for the time being. 
 
However, the only option remotely viable for religious fundamentalists who have 
aspirations to move up in the social hierarchy as a legitimate and relevant social group 
superior to most other social groups – while also having won the recognition as a superior 
group by other social groups – are to resort to violence.  Violent attacks may be the only 
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effective tool to grab the attention of the world, to let them know that religious 
fundamentalist groups are not only still existent, but are indeed a force to be reckoned 
with.   
 
Within this context it is fairly safe to argue that religious fundamentalists will remain a 
social force that should be accounted for.  According to Armstrong (2004:273) in the 
1960s and 1970s religious fundamentalists within the monotheistic framework “felt that 
their backs were to the wall and that they would have to fight in order to survive.”  These 
feelings often evoked violent reactions and, as already mentioned in the first chapter, 
terrorist attacks took on a religious nature in the 1980s.  Unfortunately this is the era we 
live in and it has not seen its end by a long way.  Sporadic violent attacks aimed at the 
secular world can be expected as long as religious fundamentalists are widely considered 
to be backwards.  Armstrong (2004:201) explains it well when she writes: “It is important 
that we understand the dread and anxiety that lie at the heart of the fundamentalist vision, 
because only then will we begin to comprehend its passionate rage, its frantic desire to 
fill the void with certainty, and its conviction of ever-encroaching evil.”  
 
This study attempted to describe the „hard-to-understand phenomenon‟ that is religious 
fundamentalism within the context of sacred texts and absolute truths, and social identity 
theory.  It is quite unfortunate when a conclusion is reached that the rejection of 
backward groups by secular society inspires reactionary violence on innocent bystanders.  
Yet, this is the conclusion that was arrived at.  In the 21
st
 century the secular state has 
been widely accepted as the governing body.  However, over the last few decades secular 
governments have been forced to deal with unpredictable, sporadic violent attacks often 
targeting important landmarks and claiming innocent lives.  The actions of religious 
fundamentalist groups are most definitely a major security concern, both external and 
internal, for the modern secular state.  The unpredictability of their attacks and the 
devastating consequences has rendered the secular state helpless against these forces.  
And it is indeed a growing concern.   
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Religions within the monotheistic framework, more specifically Christianity and Islam, 
are alive and growing.  Currently about 32% of the world population belongs to the 
Christian faith - gaining 25 million adherents annually, while 19% are Muslim (Religious 
Tolerance, 2009).  Both these religions are expanding into the South – developing 
countries - with some vigor, especially Christianity.  According to Jenkins (2001:11) 
“many Southern societies will develop a powerful Christian identity in culture and 
politics.”  Jenkins (2001:7) also argues that Southern Christians “are far more 
conservative in terms of both beliefs and moral teachings.”  Radical Protestant sects and 
traditionalist Roman Catholic churches have made the most progress (Jenkins, 2001:7).  
This should raise some awareness as southern secular governments will eventually have 
to face up to the pressures of these conservative Christian forces.  The Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life (2009) will release a comprehensive study on the global growth 
rates of both Christianity and Islam in 2010.  These statistics are sure to provide a more 
complete picture of the growing religious forces in the secular world.   
 
It is now up to the secular world, dominated by secular standards, to face this 
uncomfortable fact and find ways to effectively deal with religious fundamentalist groups 
in a manner that would ensure peaceful means and ends.  In this sense it is important to 
sufficiently address questions such as: How can the secular world convince religious 
fundamentalists to stop using violence as a means to an end?  How can religious 
fundamentalists be incorporated into mainstream society without having to face feelings 
of backwardness and inferiority?  But if, and how the secular world can achieve this, is 
surely an avenue for future research. 
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